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Introduction
The Informal Economy looms large! The importance, magnitude and signi cance of the vast
range of socio-economic activities taking place within and across diverse spaces of informality,
particularly in nations situated in the Global South; can neither be overstated or underestimated.
According to the International Labor Organization (ILO, 2018 p.v), approximately 60% of the
world’s employed population - 2 billion people - obtain their source of income through their
engagement in informal spaces.

On the African continent, where the informal economy is described as “backbone of economic
activities in urban Africa” (Guven & Karlen, 2020), it is reported that informal economic
activities accounts for over 80% of jobs within the continent. Furthermore, it has also been noted
that the main participants operating along the terrain of informality are the youths (95.8% ages
15-24) and women (92.1%) on the continent, “and is an important contributor to poverty
alleviation” (ibid, 2020). In Nigeria, which maintains a prominent position in the world as the
most populous and richest nation on the African continent, approximately 65% of the nation’s
GDP is derived from the informal economy (Medina, Jonelis & Cangul, 2017 p. 5). Furthermore,
it has also been reported that the informal economy “accounted for about 90% of new jobs in
the country, about 80% of all non-agricultural employment and about 60% of urban jobs
created” (Uko, Akpanoyoro & Ekpe, 2020 p. 66).

In spite of the crucial and pivotal role which the informal economy have proven to play in
nations such as Nigeria, the vast range of activities and transactions taking place across diverse
spaces of informality are facing severe challenges, stemming from policymakers from
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international institutions, such as the International Labor Organization (ILO), the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank; which often associate pervasive informality with
“signi cantly lower government revenues and expenditures, less effective policy institutions, more
burdensome tax and regulatory regimes, and weaker governance”. Additionally, it is also argued
that informality makes it dif cult for the State to invest and provide necessary public services
(Ohnsorge and Yu, 2021 p. 134).

As a result, national governments have been advised to restrain the economic activities occurring
across diverse spaces of informality; and begin the process of enacting and implementing policies
geared towards the “formalization” or transition towards the formal economy. According to the
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD, 2007 p. 76), the rational
for this is that the formal economy would “provide higher quality, better paid, more suitable jobs;
build investor con dence (and increase investment); and broaden the tax base (potentially
permitting lower tax rates)”.

In response to the issues raised by those advocating for the “formalization” of the vast range of
socio-economic activities taking place across diverse spaces of informality, this thesis is of the
opinion that the chief reason why the informal economy remains prominent in resource rich
nations, such as Nigeria; stems from the profound failure and negligence of the myopic and
small-minded crop of political elites governing the nation. Lacking foresight, these individuals
have consistently failed to invest in key sectors, such as, education, communication, healthcare,
transportation, amongst other critical infrastructures; multitudes of peoples would be provided
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with the opportunity, not just to gain meaningful employment; but also improve, re ne and
upgrade their socio-economic livelihood and welfare.

In Nigeria, those bearing the brunt of this staggering incompetence and negligence of those in
positions of authority are the youths, particularly those in rural regions, which are often devoid
of any form of socio-economic empowerment or access to most basic of infrastructures.
opportunities. To ensure their survival, they make the rational decision to migrate to urban
spaces, where they undertake a wide range of informal economic activities - both legal and illegal
- as they attempt to escape from the claws of poverty.

This thesis seeks to explore the ways in which the Informal Economy provides a safety net for the
youth population in Nigeria. Although Nigeria has the biggest economic and population based
on the African continent, the tumultuous socio-economic and political predicaments which
continues to confound the nation has made it almost impossible for the Nigerian State to respond
to the needs of the population - particularly the youths. In response to the challenges they face,
multitudes of people have chosen to engage, integrate and situate themselves within spaces of
informality in order to ensure and guarantee their survival in an environment lacking of any
form of empowerment.

In order to back up this line of argument, this thesis shall draw upon a wide range of academic
and scholarly literatures, alongside articles and publications authored by policymakers,
particularly those emanating from international institutions broaching on the discourse of the
informal economy. The secondary research of this thesis would focus on the conceptualization of
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governing the informal economy, alongside the characterizations of the activities taking place
across diverse spaces of informality.

Furthermore, this thesis shall also draw upon the eldwork research on the informal economy
conducted in Gishiri, a community resettlement village in Abuja, the capital of Nigeria. This
eldwork research is based on the engagements, interactions and observations with individuals
operating along the terrain of informality in this community. The ndings from this eldwork
research is based on the individual and group interactions with the youths, alongside observations
of the the socio-economic and political activities they undertake in informal spaces. The reason
why the youths were chosen as the focus for this study stems from the recognition that whilst they
are the majority population in the nation (over 60% of the population are below 25 years of age).
The main objective is to analyze and examine the circumstances which informs their decision to
situate themselves in space of informality. This is of signi cance because it provides the
opportunity to compare and contrast the literature and rhetoric of the informal economy with
the activities and situation on the ground.
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the informal economy, drawing attention to origins of the concept, the schools of thoughts

Literature Review
It must be recognized that our knowledge of the informal economy continues to evolve owing to the
publication of several written works - both historical and contemporary - by esteemed and respected
individuals, from various professional elds; whose contributions to this discourse continues to in uence
and shape our opinions and understanding of this enigmatic concept.

This review is divided into three (3) main sections. The rst section analyzes the informal economy from a
theoretical point of view, by drawing attention to the perspective of various academic scholars and
policymakers on what this concept means. Additionally, this review shall examine the origins of the
informal economy concept; how to de ne the informal economy; and the main schools of thoughts which
continues to in uence our understanding of this concept. The second section of this review shall focus on
how to characterize the informal economy. Furthermore, we shall also explore the size of the informal
economy alongside; and also analyze the reasons as to why the informal economy continues to grow,
particularly in nations situated in the global south; and examine the various policy instruments proposed
by various institutions, such as the International Labor Organization (ILO), the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) on how to suppress the informal economy by ensuring the ‘transition’
to the formal economy. Using the Federal Republic of Nigeria as a country of reference, the third section
shall seek to explore how the socio-economic and political conditions of a nation state in uences the
decision of peoples to engage and integrate themselves within spaces of informality. Furthermore, in order
to illustrate this point, this review shall pay special attention to the circumstances of the youth population
in order to gain an insight to the push and pull factors contributing to the growth of the informal
economy.
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Origins of the Concept:
Academic scholars and policymakers began paying close attention to vast range of socioeconomic (and political) activities taking place across and within the diverse terrain of informal
spaces, when Keith Hart, a British anthropologist, coined the term “the informal sector” to
describe “the economic activities of the low-income section of the labor force in Accra, the
urban sub-proletariat into which the unskilled and illiterate majority of migrants are drawn”
(Hart, 1973 p. 61). Hart stumbled upon this term during the course of the eldwork research he
conducted in Accra, Ghana, between 1965 to 1968. The nding of this research was rst present
to the Conference on Urban Unemployment in Africa, hosted by the Institute of Development
Studies, University of Sussex in 1971; and was subsequently published in 1973, under the title,
Informal Opportunities and Urban Unemployment, in which he detailed “this world of
economic activities outside the organized labor force” (ibid, p.68).

Following on from Hart, the International Labor Organization (ILO), in collaboration with the
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) published “Employment, Incomes and Equality
- A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment”, which was based on its mission to Kenya in
1972. This main objective of this report was to shed light on the issues associated with
employment, which “has now become chronic and intractable in nearly every developing
country” (ILO, 1972 p.xi). This report (ibid, p.1) highlighted three main issues associated with
employment in developing countries such as Kenya. The rst issue brought to the forefront
concerned “the frustration of job seekers unable to obtain the type of work or the remuneration
which they think is reasonable, or which their education has led them to expect”; another issue
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which the report made note of was “the low level - in fact the poverty level - of incomes obtained
by many producers and their families as the return on their work, whether in self or family
employment or in wage employment”; and nally, attention was drawn to “the underutilization
and low productivity of the labor force, both male and female, which re ects inef ciency in the
way labor is trained, deployed or supported with other resources”.

This report (ibid, p.1) also drew attention the challenges faced by youths, seeking avenues for
employment, by noting that “for young persons, whether educated or not, to enter the labour
force either with a frustrating round of job seeking or animated by resentment at missing
opportunities which they feel they deserve is hardly a good way for them to acquire the
experience and work attitudes required for a productive life, nor does it augur well for social
stability”.

As explained by Bangasser (2000 p.5), “in the thinking of the 1960s, the center stage of attention
was capital formation, export promotion and the like. The conventional wisdom considered that
employment would grow as a result of advances in these areas. Leave the labor market alone to
function ‘ef ciently’; and supply and demand will ‘clear’ at the equilibrium wage rate. Any
concern about the low level of this ‘equilibrium wage’ should be addressed by making sure that
this labor is, on the supply side, well and appropriately skilled and, on the demand side,
productively used”.

However, the ILO’s report didn’t subscribe to this point of view, by noting, “previous analyses
have identi ed unemployment problems in Kenya. Our report is based on a broader analysis. We
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identify the main problem as one of employment rather than unemployment. By this we mean
that in addition to people who are not earning incomes at all, there is another - and in Kenya
more numerous - group of people whom we call ‘the working poor’. These people are working,
and possibly working very hard and strenuously, but their employment is not productive in the
sense of earning them an income which is up to a modest minimum” (ibid, p.9).

Inspired by Hart’s characterization of the activities taking place along the terrain of the informal,
during his presentation at the University of Sussex, the ILO report drew attention to the actuality
that “the bulk of employment in the informal sector, far from being only marginally productive, is
economically ef cient and pro t making, though small in scale and limited by simple
technologies, little capital and lack of links with the other (‘formal’) sector” (ibid, p.5). Owing to
the expansive eldwork research conducted in Ghana and Kenya - which continues to in uence
and shape our collective understanding of the informal economy - Hart is credited for his
“discovery” (ILO, 2013, p.2) of the informal economy; whilst the ILO is viewed as “both the
midwife and the principle international institutional home for the concept” (ibid, 2000 p.1).
However, it is important to bear in mind that the activities taking place within across the realm of
informality “doubtless existed already” (Rimmer, 1992 p.36).

A strong argument can be presented that the origins of the informal economy as a concept, can
be traced back to 1954, following the publication of “Economic Development with Unlimited
Supplies of Labor”, written by Sir Walter Arthur Lewis, in which he speculated that the
economies of developing and under-developing nations situated in the Global South was largely
made up of two different sectors; the closed economy (the traditional sector) and the open
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economy (the capitalist/modern sector) co-existing simultaneously with each other. According to
Lewis, the closed economy is “associated with rural life, agriculture, and ‘backward’ institutions
and technologies”; whilst the open economy corresponded with “urban life, modern industry, and
the use of advanced technologies” (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012 p. 258). Pertaining the closed
economy, Lewis was of the opinion that “an unlimited supply of labor may be said to exist in
those countries where population is so large relatively to capital and natural resources, that there
are large sectors of the economy where the marginal productivity of labor is negligible, zero, or
even negative” (Lewis, 1954 p.2).

Furthermore, Lewis argued that in “backwards economies knowledge is one of the scarcest
goods” (ibid, 1954, p.6); the vast range of socio-economic activities taking place along this
terrain, such as “the whole range of casual jobs - the workers on the docks, the young men who
rush forward asking to carry your bag as you appear, the jobbing gardener, and the like” (p.2) are
more of less economically insigni cant, due of their large numbers of peoples carrying out these
activities; therefore “their number could be halved without reducing output” (ibid, 1954, p.2).
Owing to its close proximity with “a few industries highly capitalized, such as mining or electric
power, side by side with the most primitive techniques; a few highly capitalized plantations,
surrounded by a sea of peasants; between the few highly westernized, trousered natives, educated
in western universities, speaking western languages, and glorifying in Beethoven, Mill, Marx and
Einstein” (ibid, 1954, p, 5-6); Lewis was of the opinion that it was only inevitable that at some
point, the “closed economy” would would eventually cease to exist, due to the fact that those
actively engaging and participating within the closed economy would wholeheartedly embrace
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the advantages and bene ts guaranteed as being part and parcel of the open “capitalist”
economy (ibid, 1954, p, 5-6)
Keith Hart - Ghana (1965 - 1968)
The research carried out by Hart in Ghana between 1965 to 1968, where he observed the
migratory patterns of the Frafra people, moving from rural to urban spaces; alongside the range
of “informal economic activities” they undertook when they settled in cities such as Accra, he set
out to determine whether, “the reserve army of urban unemployed and underemployed really
constitute a passive, exploited majority in cities like Accra, or do their informal economic
activities possess some autonomous capacity for generating growth in the incomes of the urban
(and rural) poor?” (Hart, 1973, p.61). In response to the negative rhetoric leveled against the
informal economic activities, Hart sought to stress the “important part played by these workers in
supplying many of the essential services on which life in the city is dependent” (ibid, 1973 p.68).

In this research, Hart (p.78)

drew attention to the prevalence of “job duplication” and

“moonlighting” in urban cities such as Accra, where “multiple informal employment - both with
and without simultaneous wage employment - is almost universal in the economic behavior of
Accra’s sub-proletariat. Only rarely is an individual or family dependent on one one source of
income”. Seeking other sources of income was in direct response to a combination of monetary
lapses, such as “price in ation, inadequate wages, and an increasing surplus to the requirements
of the urban labor market” (ibid, 1973 p.61). Such developments

not only in uences the

rationale for seek other avenues for employment, but also served as a motivating factor to become
more engaged and integrated within spaces of informality, because in such volatile economic
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landscape, the idea of “‘one man, one job’ is a risky assumption, especially when low-paid, low
hours employment is involved” (ibid, 1973 p.66).

Hart (1973, p.69) draws distinction between formal income opportunities and the legitimate and
illegitimate informal income opportunities. Formal income opportunities are derived from the
following: (i) public sector wages; (ii) private sector wages; (iii) pensions, unemployment bene ts.
Legitimate informal income opportunities are sourced from either “primary and secondary
activities”, such as farming, gardening, shoemaking, garment makers; or “tertiary enterprises”
occupations, which entails activities such as construction of houses, provision of transportation
services, the renting of spaces for personal or commercial use. Illegitimate informal income
opportunities refer to either “services” such as pawnbroking, drug-pushing, prostitution,
smuggling and protection rackets; or “transfers” relating to gambling, petty theft, embezzlement,
amongst other activities which may be deemed as illegal and unlawful by the governing
authorities.

Another important distinction which Hart (p.83) brought to the forefront of this discourse
concerned the difference between being “unemployed” and “underemployed”. According to
Hart, “most urban workers lacking formal employment and therefore ‘out of work’ maybe said to
be, in the most basic sense, unemployed”. It is argued that individuals who fall into this category
are open to obtaining formal wage employment (“i.e. xed, regular, and relatively permanent”
jobs), providing that it does hinder their capacity to continue their participation in the informal
economy. The unemployed are “those who will not accept income opportunities open to them for
which they are quali ed, and this often means rejecting informal means of making a living”.
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Perhaps the most prominent groups of people who fall into this category are youths who have
attained a certain level of academic quali cations. (p.83). Finally, those who fall into the category
of the “underemployed” are those whose “wage job alone cannot provide for a family’s
subsistence needs” (ibid, 1973 p.84).

The International Labor Organization - Kenya (1972)
The 1972 joint report from the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) on Kenya was centered around the issue of employment on the
African continent. According to the report “we identify the main problem as one of employment
rather than unemployment. By this, we mean that in addition to people who are not earning
incomes at all, there is another group of people whom we call ‘the working poor’” (ILO, 1972
p.9).

A major takeaway from the ILO’s report was the constructive and favorable manner in which it
characterizes the activities taking place in spaces of informality. For instance, by way of stepping
away from using archaic terms, the report chose to use the designations of formal sector or
informal sector, “to describe a duality that avoids the bias against the low-incomes sector inherent
in the traditional-modern dichotomy” (ibid 1972 p.503-4). Furthermore, the report worked at
great lengths to argue that both the formal and informal sectors “are modern; both are the
consequence of the urbanization that has taken place in Kenya over the last 50 years” (ibid 1972
p.504)
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The approach adopted in this ILO report served to backdrop to challenge the cynical and
obstructive views and rhetoric assigned to informal economic activities, which were perceived as
“stagnant, non-dynamic, and a net for the unemployed and for the thinly veiled idlness into
which those who cannot nd formal wage jobs must fall” (ibid 1972, p.5). Pushing back against
such reasoning, the report explained that “often people fail to realize the extent of economically
ef cient production in the informal sector because of the low incomes received by most workers
in the sector” (ibid 1972, p.5). Unfortunately, these negative characterizations and rhetoric leveled
against informal economic activities can be traced to “academic analysts who often encouraged
and fostered such an interpretation (ibid 1972, p.5). However, the report notes that the negative
rhetoric assigned to the informal economic activities such as such as carpentry, masonry, etc;
stems from either their inability to acknowledge that these activities are “far from being
marginally productive”, rather, they are “economically ef cient and pro t making” due to the
simple reason that they are “offering virtually the full range of basic skills needed to provide
goods and services for a large though often poor section of the population (ibid 1972, p.5).

According to the ILO, the main attributes of the informal sector are: (i) ease of entry; (ii) reliance
on indigenous resources; (iii) family ownership of enterprises; (iv) small scale of operations; (v)
labor-intensive and adapted technology; and (vi) unregulated and competitive markets.
Furthermore, these activities are “largely ignored, rarely supported, often regulated and
sometimes actively discouraged by the government” (ibid 1972 p.6). This is a stark difference
from the formal economy, which is characterized by: (i) dif cult entry; (ii) reliance on overseas
resources; (iii) corporate ownership; (iv) large scale of operation; and (v) protected market through tariffs, quotas and trade licenses. (ibid, 1972 p.6).
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De ning the Concept of the Informal Economy
Since the concept of the informal economy emerged in the early 1970s, a substantial amount of
time, effort and resources has been devoted by academic scholars towards attaining one speci c
goal: de ning the concept of the informal economy. However, to the dismay of many, the
progression geared towards this has proven to be an uphill battle. According to Buehn and
Schneider (2012, p. 140) the reason why its been dif cult to nd a proper de nition stems from
the fact that “information about the extent of the shadow economy, who is engaged, and the
frequency of these activities, and their magnitude is crucial for making effective and ef cient
decisions regarding the allocations of a country’s resources in this area”. The challenges they face
when attempting to explore the informal economy stems from their inability to gain access to
relevant information, which continues to prove exceptionally dif cult, because “all individuals
engaged in these activities do not wish to be identi ed. Hence, doing research in this area can be
considered as a scienti c passion for knowing the unknown” (ibid, 2012).

In contrast with the straightforward (and scienti c) de nition of the formal economy, which
Daniels (2004 p. 502) describes as being “based on the employment of waged labor within a
framework of rules and regulations, usually devised and implemented by the state, on working
hours, minimum wages, health and safety at work, or the social security obligations of employers
and employees”. Furthermore, these activities taking place across in the formal economy can be
measured using various economic statistical tools such as in ation rate, unemployment rate,
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Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Gross National Product (GNP), amongst others statistical
instruments devised and formulated by economists and policymakers, which enables them
monitor the health of the economy.

Although scholars acknowledge and recognize the fact that “informal economic activities have
long been part of the total national economy, and a large literature documents their presence”
(McLain, 2010 p.1); one of the many sources of dispute amongst scholars “centers on whether to
include non market transactions, and if so, what type of non market transactions (e.g., unpaid
work, self-provisioning, subsistence activities) to include” (ibid, p.4). Another reason attributed for
this “lack of clarity” and consensus when it comes to providing a de nition for the informal
economy results from the “use of such a varied assortment of designations for this sector”
(Guerguil, 1988 p. 57). For instance, terms such as “alternative economy, black market economy,
cash economy, clandestine economy, parallel economy, shadow economy”, etc are just a few out
of a variety often used by scholars whenever they chose to make reference to the activities taking
place across spaces of informality. In response to these variety of terms, Moser (1978, p. 1051)
explains that “since the utility of the informal sector concept was recognized, researchers and
policy-makers in a number of different but related disciplines have applied it to a diversity of
empirical data, and in many different concepts. What has resulted is complete confusion about
what exactly is meant by the informal sector”.

Owing to the focus which academic scholars have devoted to sourcing out a scienti c de nition
of the informal economy, it is argued that they have lost sight of the bigger picture, by failing to
pay attention to the peculiar character and dynamic nature of the activities taking place in the
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sphere of the informal and the manner in which informal actors and their socio-economic and
political activities positions itself, either as complimentary or in opposition to the formal
economy. According to Gerry (1974, p.6), “it is noticeable that most writers and researchers in
this eld intuitively recognize these various differentiating characteristics; however, it is probably
this preoccupation with characterization and the re ning of de nitions which has caused such
studies to neglect the fact that, to an important extent, it is the relations between these different
systems or sub-systems of production which determine those phenomena which will characterize
each of the (productive) ensemble, and will lay the foundations for the functioning of the whole”.

In an attempt to bypass this tricky hurdle, scholars have often resorted to the use of metaphors to
best describe this elusive, yet intriguing concept. For instance, Hans Singer parallels the informal
economy to a giraffe, which is “dif cult to de ne by usual standards, but easy to recognize when
you see one” (Charmes, n.d p.4). Hernando de Soto compares the informal economy with an
elephant; whilst Bruno Lautier argues that it's neither of these two: it's a unicorn. But perhaps the
best and most proli c metaphor is provided by Peter Kilby (1971, p.1), who compares the
informal economy to a Heffalump (a cartoon character from Winnie the Pooh!). “The Heffalump
is a rather large and very important animal. He has been hunted by many individuals using
various ingenious trapping devices, but no one so far has succeeded in capturing him. All who
claim to have caught sight of him report that he is enormous, but they disagree on his
particularities. Not having explored his current habitat with suf cient care, some hunters have
used as bait their own favorite dishes and have then tried to persuade people that what they
caught was a Heffalump. However, very few are convinced and the hunt goes on”.
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According to Charmes (2000), “it may seem paradoxical to attempt to evaluate a sector the very
nature of which is to remain unregistered or insuf ciently registered just because it is unwilling to
be evaluated. Nevertheless, progress has recently been made, particularly in the wake of the boost
provided by the adoption of an international de nition”. The de nition which Charmes makes
reference to stems from the International Labor Organization (ILO, 1993 p.2), which de ned the
concept of the informal sector in 1993 as “broadly characterized as consisting of units engaged
in the production of goods or services with the primary objective of generating employment and
incomes to the persons concerned. These units typically operate at a low level of organization,
with little or no division between labor and capital as factors of production and on a small scale.
Labor relations – where they exist – are based mostly on casual employment, kinship or personal
and social relations rather than contractual arrangements with formal guarantees”. Intriguingly,
it is important to note that not all scholars are subscribe with the de nition provided by the
International Labor Organization.
For instance, Lindell (2010, p.1 & 5) notes that “despite much writings on the persistence and
growth of informal economies, our understanding of the politics of informality has been
hampered by deeply entrenched views that tend to deprive people in the informal economy of
agency. The notion of informality does not necessarily involve a dualistic view of the economy as
having two separate sectors, underpinned by unilinear assumptions of economic development,
where the informal is understood as marginal, residual and a mere appendage to the formal
economy. Rather, the boundary between the formal and informal is blurred. The two
interconnect in varying degrees and in multiple ways and often contain elements of each other.
Both feel the in uence of the same global forces and citizens straddle the two spheres as they
pursue their income strategies”.
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Maintaining the same trajectory of argument, Mortenbock (2015 p.105) is of the opinion that
“this expanding grey zone of informal economic activities in which an ever increasing number of
regions, groups of people and areas of life are becoming involved cannot be explained solely by
structural unemployment and income inequality – as the International Labor Organization (ILO)
tend to argue – or by the legal barriers that advocates that advocates of micro-entrepreneurship
argue are necessitating an immersion of informality”.
It has also been noted that scholars should deliberate and focus their attention on certain
attributes within the con nes of the informal before attempting to de ne this complex, yet
enigmatic concept. For instance, Laguerre (1994, p.6), argues that when attempting to de ne this
concept, we “must take into consideration a large number of variables. These include: its origin,
either as preceding the formal system or as growing from it; its relations to the formal system; the
participation of its actors in the formal system; time and space factors; the meanings of everyday
practices; and the structural location of informal practices in relation to other practices. Does the
informal share characteristics with the formal system? These are criteria that may provide clues
for a de nition of the informal system”.
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Schools of Thought
There are three main schools of thought which continues to govern the debate and in uence our
understanding of the informal economy: (I) the Dualist School, (II) the Structuralist School and
(III) the Neoliberal School.

The Dualist School
Proponents of this school, in uenced by the likes of Lewis, are of the opinion that there is no
relationship between the formal and informal economies. They view informal economic activities
as representing “a little more than a residue or leftover of pre-capitalism”, as agains the the
formal economy, which is heralded as a “thriving phenomenon” which is deeply embedded and
rooted with modernity, technological evolution and transformation (Huang, Xue & Wang, 2020
p. 2-3). Furthermore, they argue that when “nations step into a certain advanced stage of
economic development”, the activities taking place across spaces of informality would decrease
and eventually disappear into the ether (ibid, 2020 p.3).

However, the continued existence and growth of the informal economy stems from “a lack of
dynamic growth and unavailability of modern employment” (Navarette, 2015 p.38). In other
words, the existence and growth of the informal economy is directly linked to the inability of the
formal economy to provide jobs and meet the demands from growing populations, particularly
those situated in the global south. In order to mitigate the expansion of the informal economy,
the adherents of this school propose that governments should work towards assisting
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entrepreneurs by generating more jobs and provide incentives such as “access to credit and
business development programs as well as social protection services for their families” (Marinescu
& Mircioi, 2019 p. 313) as a way to entice and secure the transition from the informal to the
formal economy.

The Structuralist School
For adherents of this school, there is no question as to relationship between the formal and
informal economies. According to Moser (1978, p.1057), informal economic activities are existing
“at the margins of the capitalist mode of production but nevertheless integrated into it and
subordinated to it”. Owing to the fact that capitalist rms have to respond to an array of issues,
both domestic and global in nature such as: competition, the growing power of employees as a
result of “strong unionization of formal employees, state laws and tax regulations, globalization”;
the solution for capitalist rms is to take drastic measures aimed at the reduction of production
and labor cost” (Marinescu & Mircioi, 2019 p. 313-314).

Structuralists argue that the “informalization of economies” is a calculated and deliberate tactic
used by capitalist rms as they endeavor to “cut costs, improve competitiveness, and weaken the
power of unions” (Huang, Xue & Wang, p.3). The consequence of such strategies often results in
a race to the bottom, whereby capitalist

rms, pressured to increase pro t and aided by

globalization, are able to migrate to countries with the cheapest labor and lax tax regulations.

According to (Sassen, 1997 p. 5 &19), “the combination of economic, political and technical
forces… the new urban economy not only contributes to strengthening existing inequalities but
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sets in motion a whole series of new dynamics of inequality. The new growth sectors - specialized
services and nance - contain capabilities for pro t making vastly superior to those of more
traditional economic sectors. The latter are essential to the operation of the urban economy and
the daily needs of residents, but their survival is threatened in a situation where nance and
specialized services can earn super-pro ts”.
At this juncture, Apple Inc serves as a typical example. With stocks valued at US$3trillion
(Leswing, 2022), Apple maintains an enviable position as the most pro table company in the
world. An argument can be made that a major reason why such a corporation has been able to
attain such lofty heights has to do with the fact that it has been able to take advantage of the lax
regulations in China, where it produces it products through Pegatron factories. An investigation
conducted by the British Broadcast Corporation (BBC) focusing on the working conditions of
Pegatron factories found that workers are forced to work over time (BBC, 2014).
This analysis is also supported by the China Labor Watch (2016), which draws attention to the
fact Pegatron has been able to recruit “student interns, who had overtime work amounting to 80
hours per month on average”; which is the amount of time for full time employment. Such is the
case, even though “Chinese law forbids companies from asking interns to work overtime”.
According to Chabal (2009, p. 151) “the informalization of the state also brings further trouble
for the powerless in that it increases everyday arbitrariness. Indeed, the less the state functions as
it is supposed to do, the more it becomes a source for exploitation. Not only do ordinary people
meet constant demands for kickbacks in their daily dealings with state of cials but they are also
subject to the whims of all of those who can exercise power over them”. For structuralist, the
only way around this is for governments to step in with strong public policy aimed at addressing
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the existing inequality and “unequal relations” between capitalist corporations and subordinate
businesses, thereby demanding for essentials such as good minimum wage and better working
conditions.
The Neoliberal School
This school of thought views the informal economy as “a hotbed of emerging entrepreneurs,
constrained only by unnecessary, slanted and super uous legislation” (Wilson, 2011 p.206). They
are of the opinion that the existence of the informal economy is the direct consequence of “a
mercantilist legal system that works to maintain elite privileges and exclude poor people from the
market economy” (Navarette, p.43). Neoliberals are of the opinion that operating informally is
the only option available to the participants within and across its diverse terrain, as they object to
the strenuous regulations imposed on their economic activities by the state.

In other words, “informality is thus conceptualized as a representation of free market forces
responding to the failure of state intervention” (ibid, 2017 p.4). Adherents of this school focus
attention on the “ingenuity, entrepreneurship, and rationality of informal workers in creaking
income opportunities and alleviating their poverty in the context of the high cost of legality”
(ibid, 2017 p.4).

In order to integrate informal economic activity into the national economy, it is necessary for the
state to get rid of burdensome regulatory practicers, which should motivate and persuade
informal agents to register their enterprise “and extend the legal rights to property for assets held
by informal businesses so that they can capitalize on their productive potential by converting the
assets they own in addition value” (Marinescu & Mircioi, 2019 p. 313).
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Size of the Informal Economy
The sheer size and reach of the informal economy remains unparalleled. The ILO (2018 p.v),
estimates that “more than 60% of the world’s employed population earn their livelihoods in the
informal economy” – ranging from 85.8 percent in Africa; to 62 percent in Asia and the Paci c;
68.6 percent in the Arab states; 40 percent in the Americas and 25.1 percent in Europe and
Central Asia” (ILO, 2018). First and foremost, it has to be noted that in nations situated in many
nations situated in the global south, the vast range of informal economic activities has assumed
the role of being “the main driver of job growth”, and more importantly, they are “now playing
the major labor absorbing role that the agricultural sector used to play in the past” (Assaad, Kraft
& Yassin, 2018 p.16).

According to Bugnicourt (2000), who refers to the informal economy as “the popular economy”
notes that the vast range of socio-economic activities taking place across diverse spaces of
informality “frequently provides more or less satisfactory occupations for two thirds of the
working population. It is the only immediate opportunity for most young people who wish to
work, by generating low-pay jobs and income. It responds, even if only imperfectly, to the
essential needs of the poor and some people in the higher social strata. The need to feed oneself,
clothe oneself, acquire or develop skills and knowledge, nd accommodation, bene t from a few
vital services, clean oneself, move about, communicate and have some kind of social life felt by
people with very limited disposable incomes generates a very signi cant demand, which can be
met from the informal economy, as well as from the modern one. The popular economy meets
this demand more or less successfully”.
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Ironically, the informal economy thrives in some of the biggest economies in the world. For
instance, gures show that in nations such as the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia (KSA), the Federative Republic of Brazil, and the People’s Republic of China; the
vast range of socio-economic activities taking places across diverse spaces of informality within
these nations contributes approximately: 60% (Olubiyi, 2021); 47% (Gamal & Dahalan, 2016
p.76); 47.1% (Romero, 2021) and 22% (Huang et al, 2020 p.1) respectively to their Gross
Domestic Product (GDP).

Furthermore, Neuwirth (2011, p.41), – who describes the informal economy as ‘System D’ –
speculates that the combined GDP value of the activities taking place in spaces of informality
around the world “is close to US$10 trillion. Which makes for another astonishing revolution. If
System D were an independent nation, united in a single political structure - call it the United
Street Sellers Republic (USSR) or, perhaps, Bazaaristan - it would be an economic superpower,
the second-largest economy in the world (the United States, with a GDP of $14 trillion, is
numero uno)”. Although a lot has changed since the publication of this book, Neuwirth’s
illustration serves to demonstrate the economic value of the activities taking place in spaces of
informality on a global scale.
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Tackling the Informal Economy
In spite of the magnitude, scale and signi cance of the informal economy, which serves as a
source of employment for billions of peoples worldwide, it remains that informal economic
activities “remain controversial” (Porta and Shleifer, 2014, p. 109). In an article written by Farrell
(2004), in which she acknowledged that the majority of economic activities taking place across
the terrain of informality “are not outright criminal enterprises, such as drug cartels, ma as,
prostitution rings, and illegal gambling operations”, it was noted that the very existence of
informal economic activities poses a signi cant threat, because they “can dampen productivity
and undermine a nation’s nancial health”. Furthermore, she argues that “informal players
operate at just half the average productivity level of formal companies and at a small fraction of
the productivity of the best companies – and as a result, informal companies persistently drag
down a country’s overall productivity and standard of living” (ibid, 2004).

The World Bank further entrenches the point of view presented above by arguing that
“informality has gained increasing attention as a possible drag on growth and rising social well
being, and as a force corrosive to the integrity of our societies. Given the long standing negative
connotations of informality – inferior working conditions, low-productivity rms, disrespect for
the rule of law, to name a few – it is not surprising that the rise in informality over the 1990s
across several measures is viewed with concern and as meriting closer investigation” (Perry, 2007
p.1). In conjunction with this argument, Elbahnasawy, Ellis and Adom (2016, p. 31) argue that
the informal economy “promotes the inef cient use of scarce resources, encourages adoption of
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low-return technology and small-scale production, distorts investment, and aggravates income
inequality”.
Furthermore, Buehn and Schneider (2012, p.141) refer to those participating within the informal
economy as “informal agents”, making the conscious decision to integrate themselves into spaces
of informality in order to “avoid payment of income, value added, or other taxes; to avoid
payment of social security contributions; to avoid having to meet certain legal labor market
standards, such as minimum wages, maximum working hours, safety standards, etc; and to avoid
complying with certain administrative procedures, such as completing statistical questionnaires,
or other administrative forms” even though they are fully aware that such actions are illegal and
could potentially land them at crosshairs with state enforcement authorities”.

Owing to these negative characterizations and rhetoric, it has become evident that the vast range
of socio-economic activities taking place across diverse spaces of informality “troubles
policymakers in developing countries because it is seen as being associated with low productivity
and poverty” (Keen, 2015). This is manifested in the manner in which national governments in
the Global South, in uenced by donor nations and institutions have sought to look for ways to
restrain and suppress activities taking place across the terrain of the informal. In order to
extinguish the informal economy, national governments have adopted coercive and harsh
measures of harassment, intimidation, alongside the threat of persecution if they desist from
engaging in these activities. As Bromley (2000, p.20) notes, “at the street level in most Latin
American, African and poor Asian countries, neither vendors nor inspectors and police have
much detailed knowledge of the regulations, and so enforcement is often ad hoc. Long periods of
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tolerance are interspersed with short waves of persecution. In the occasional crackdowns, noncompliance with a great variety of obscure laws, codes, and regulations can be invoked to justify
displacements, con scation and arrest”.
(At this point, how can we forget about Arab Spring uprising, which was literally sparked by
Mohammed Bouazizi, the 26 year old Tunisian who asked, 'How do you expect me to make a
living’ as he set himself alight, in response and reaction to the abuse and harassment he
experienced at the hands of the state authorities who unjustly con scated his property?)
The 2020 ban on okadas (commercial motorcycles) and keke napeps (commercial tricycles) on the
streets of Lagos, and the creating of a “State Taskforce” to enforce this order, under the pretext
of 'security’ serves as typical example as to how governments attempt to quell and suppress the
informal economy. During the announcement of this ban, the Lagos State Commissioner for
Information and Strategy, stated that “after a robust assessment of the debate on what has been
widely referred to as the motorcycle (okada) and tricycle (keke) menace, the Lagos State
government and the State Security Council have decided that the security and safety of lives of
Lagosians are paramount. The gures are scary. From 2016 to 2019, there were over 10,000
accidents recorded at the general hospitals alone. The total number of deaths from reported
cases is over 600 as at date. Also, the rate of crimes aided by okada and keke keeps rising. They
are also used as getaway means by criminals” (Erezi, 2020).
However, it is critically important to bear in mind that such actions often prove to be both
counterintuitive and counterproductive. Whilst it is duly recognized that security challenges must
be addressed and tackled by government authorities whenever and wherever they arise, a major
reason why the ban of these commercial vehicles - which remains the most effective way to
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maneuver and navigate the heavy traf c in the most populous city in Africa - proves controversial
stems from the fact that the government haven’t provided any viable economic alternatives for
these okada and keke napep drivers. According to a driver affected by this ban, “where do they
(the government) want us to go? We are going no where because we are going a legitimate work.
This is what I do to feed my family with other responsibilities. We normally come out in the night
now to avoid taskforce in the daytime” (ibid, 2020). From the onset, it was obvious that those
affected by this ban were never going to take it lightly. This was exhibited on various social media
platforms, which displayed the violent reactions waged by these affected drivers, against the
government and the regulating taskforce, after the seizure of several vehicles. Due to the lack of
foresight which characterizes this enforcement, Kazeem (2020) argues that “the ban on
motorcycles and tricycles is part of the state’s grand design for a mega-city which is rooted in
aesthetics rather than reality”.
In acknowledgement of these challenges associated with the informal economy, the ILO (2013)
has made it a primary objective to take steps towards remedying the obscure working conditions
of those operating along the terrain of the informal, by advocating for the implementation of
certain regulatory frameworks in the form of the Four Pillars of Decent Work, geared towards (I)
Employment; (II) Social Protection; (III) Social Dialogue; and (IV) Rights (ibid, p.11). The
rationale behind this policy is geared towards ensuring and facilitating the transition of workers
from the informal to formal economy.
According to Dasgupta (2016), the transition towards formalization is contingent on making sure
that workers entering into the workforce are provided with “robust legal protection” as outlined
by the UN commission on legal employment of the poor, which calls for the entrenchment of
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conditions and workers bene ts” which would ultimately propel them to gain access to the
nancial markets; alongside setting “inclusive hiring target and on the job training”, which would
signi cantly reduce issues associated with barrier to entry, such as “the absence of requisite
educational quali cations and the lack of corporate networks”.
It is also argued that having such regulations in place would provide informal workers – especially
the working poor - with the opportunity to “have access to justice and the judicial system”; giving
them the opportunity to defend their freedoms and rights. Another recommendation from the
World Bank (ibid, 2016) is geared towards “inclusive hiring targets and on-the-job training”. Due
to the fact that those in engage within spaces of informality face a high barrier of entry into the
formal economy, as a result of their lack of education quali cations, it falls on the formal
economy to “bridge this gap by employing people from low-income households, investing in them
through on-the-job training along with on- eld exposure to working systems”.

fi

fi

fi

fi

32

fi

fi

labor and property rights due to the fact that such protections would ensure for “better working

Analyzing the Root Causes of the Informal Economy
Whilst Farrell (2004), the World Bank (2007); Elbahnasawy et al (2016); Buehn and Schneider
(2012); are united in their critique and disapproval the vast range of activities taking place across
diverse spaces of informality, it is critically important to note that they seldom give attention to
the reasons why people chose to engage and integrate themselves within spaces of informality.
Surely, it cannot be that 60% of the world’s employed population are actively seeking avenues to
escape paying their taxes? Furthermore, before setting lofty and towering goals geared towards
formalizing the informal economy, it is critically important to understand the key factors which
in uences and motivates an individual to engage and integrate within spaces of informality.
Furthermore, it should not be ignored that the “low rate of job growth in the large formal private
sector is particularly disappointing given the degree of attention this segment of the private
sector receives from policymakers” (ibid, 2018 p.17).

First and foremost, it is critically important to recognize that the most pertinent reason as to why
multitudes of peoples around the world - the youths in particular - chose to immerse themselves
within spaces of informality stems from their innate and natural desire to survive. Karl (2000)
explains that, “there are millions like them all over the world. Driven by a natural desire for
survival, men and women, the old and even children are doing what they can too drag themselves
out of poverty. By their actions, which could actually be described as reactions, they have helped
to create what is rightly or wrongly termed the informal sector. This sector continues to teem
with an abundance of continuously expanding activities performed by illicit street vendors, shoeshiners, small commercial, production or service enterprises and a great many of other economic
agents. The informal sector is ruled by resourcefulness and imagination. Re ecting the energy of
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people at the base of the social pyramid, it provides almost the only possibility of escape, and is
frequently a source of hope, for those who work in it, either because of they have to or out of
convenience, with the common objective of improving their living conditions or simply of
surviving”.

Additionally, Becker (2004, p.9) notes that, a combination of factors, such as: (I) barriers of entry
into the formal economy; (II) weak institutions; (III) demand for low-cost goods and services; (IV)
economic hardship and poverty; and (V) rural-urban migration; are major determinants, which
continues to in uence the decision of millions of people to engage and integrate within spaces of
informality. Re ecting on the combination of these factors, it is pertinent to ask one simple
question: Is the State complicit in contributing to the growth of the informal economy?

Of Marginalization and Social Exclusion
The overarching reason why multitudes of people are forced to ‘react’ by engaging and
integrating within spaces of informality stems from the abhorrent marginalization and resulting
social exclusion leveled against the citizenry, by those in positions of authority and power.
Marginalization is de ned by Lamsa (2012, p.4), as “the weakening of the ligatures between the
individual and the society. The marginalized are those who have been left on the dark edges.
Social exclusion is the utmost form of marginalization”. Levitas, Eldin, Gordon & Demy (2002,
p.9) describes Social Exclusion as “a complex and multi-dimensional process. It involves the lack
or denial of resources, rights, and good and services, and the inability to participate in the
normal relationships and activities, available to majority of the people in a society, whether in
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economic, social, cultural or political arenas. It affects both the quality of life and individuals and
the equity and cohesion of society as a whole”.

In societies where marginalization and the resulting social exclusion are rife, it is apparent that
those in positions of authority (the State) have neglected their most fundamental duties and
responsibilities to their citizenry. In order to illustrate this point, the Federal Republic of Nigeria
would be used as a country of reference. Popularly referred to as ‘the Giant of Africa’ owing to
her possessing a population base of over 201 million (the largest on the African continent, and
the most populous black nation on the surface of the earth); this nation continues to maintain
occupy - at least on paper - a prestigious position on the global stage. According to the World
Bank (2021) not only is this nation the largest economy on the African continent, but also 27th
largest economy in the world based on nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 24th largest
economy in the world in terms on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP).

In reality, this nation state - in spite of its global prominence - continues to be weakened under
the weight of an array of manufactured and self-in icted lacerations which continues to hinder
the capacity of the citizenry to make certain moves towards the attainment of their personal
socio-economic and political goals and objectives. In the words of the prominent Nobel laureate,
Wole Soyinka, “we are in a mess. This country is in a mess. It is disintegrating before our very
eyes. This government is oundering. The problem here is that the government does not have a
holistic grasp of the problems in Nigeria… If we are looking to this government for a solution,
then it means we are lost” (Odeh, 2021). Very few Nigerians would dispute this analysis. This is
because of the realization that there is no logical or rational reason to explain how or why a
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nation such as Nigeria, which is blessed and rich with human and natural resources, can have
41% - 88,434,769 - of her population are living in extreme poverty (World Poverty Clock, 2021);
hence being “the poverty capital of the world” (Borgen, 2020)

Unfortunately, this should not come as a surprise. It is virtually impossible to write about Nigeria
without bringing up the issue of corruption, which continues to breed marginalization within the
nation. According to data derived from Oxfam (2021), in under 45 years, public of cials in
Nigeria have embezzled US$20 trillion (bigger than the United States GDP in 2012!). This
incessant and immoral corruption, continues to be the major driver of marginalization and the
resulting social exclusion. Accordingly, it is noted that “poverty and inequality in Nigeria are not
due to a lack of resources, but to the ill-use, misallocation and misappropriation of such
resources. At the root is a culture of corruption combined with a political elite out of touch with
the daily struggles of average Nigerians” (ibid, 2021).

According to Silverman (1992, p. 16), “most people understand intuitively what functions, at a
minimum, governments should perform. It is from that understanding that governments derive
their legitimacy. When governments do not, in fact, perform their necessary functions and/or
where they do so in substantially ineffective ways, many of those functions will be performed in
on way or another outdone the formally and of cially sanctioned governmental system in much
the same way that necessary economic functions are performed in parallel systems under similar
circumstances”.
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The inability of the citizenry to access key public infrastructures and services is just one out of
multiple ways in which systematic and widespread marginalization and exclusion transpires. The
fact that Nigerians in the 21st century, don’t have access to basic amenities and infrastructures
such as education, healthcare, good roads and telecommunication systems; which would improve
their livelihoods and embolden the socio-economic and political posture of the State remains a
serious cause for concern.

Infrastructure De cit
There is broad consensus that investment in human capital is contingent on investing on the key
infrastructures which will give propel the socio-economic and political wellbeing; not just of the
individual, but society at large. As Puentes (2015) rightly notes, “infrastructure is the backbone of
a healthy economy”.
According to McNichol (2019), “state investment in transportation, public buildings, water
treatment systems, and other forms of vital infrastructure is key to creating good jobs and
promoting full economic recovery. The conditions of roads, bridges, schools, water treatment
plants, and other physical assets greatly in uences the economy’s ability to function and grow.
Growing communities rely on well-functioning water and sewer systems. State of the art schools
free from crowding and safety hazards improve educational opportunities for future workers.
Every state needs infrastructure improvements that can pay off economically in private-sector
investment and productive growth”. This acknowledgment and recognition seems from the
inherent realization that “concrete, steel and ber-optic cable are the essential building blocks of
the economy. Infrastructure enables trade, powers businesses, connects workers to their jobs,
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creates opportunities for struggling communities and protects the nation from an increasingly
unpredictable natural environment” (ibid, 2015). According to a World Bank survey (2018), the
nations of Japan, Sweden, Netherlands and Austria are the recipients of the best quality
infrastructure in the world. These are nations concerned with the socio-economic and political
development, evolution and growth of their citizenry. Unfortunately, no nation from Sub-Sahara
Africa appeared in the top 50. Nigeria ranked 78 out of 160, whilst Sierra Leone, Somalia,
Guinea-Bissau and Guinea ranked 156, 157, 159 and 160 respectively.
In an extensive report by Bello-Schunemann and Porter (2017, p. 2), detailing the state of
infrastructure in Nigeria, attention was drawn to the fact that the nation “faces multiples
simultaneous pressures to advance economic growth and human development in a context of a
large and rapidly growing population. Presently the greatest drag on Nigeria’s economic growth
is the country’s substantive de cit in basic physical infrastructure” (For such a country, to learn
that 90% of the transportation movements occurs via land, it isn’t only alarming or frightening
but rather, very upsetting to learn that only 15.5% of the roads are paved “compared to an
average of over 55% in the country’s global income peers” (ibid, p.17). For example, in Pakistan,
approximately 70% of the roads are paved. Categorizing physical infrastructure into
transportation, energy, water and sanitation and information and communication technologies
(ICT) (p.3), this report states that “Nigeria’s infrastructure de cit is evident across all categories as
the country performs worse than its average income peer and signi cantly worse than its average
global income peer”. According to estimated that 60 million people (approximately 30%) of the
population don’t have access to clean water (ibid, p.11). This is particularly the case in Lagos, the
most populous city on the continent, where less than 60% of urban dwellers have access to clean
water (ibid, p.13).
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The lack of electricity supply is another infrastructure de cit which continues to hinder the socioeconomic development of the nation. Popoola & Adeleye (2020, p. 242) estimates that roughly
60% of the Nigerian population have no access to electricity, whilst 94% don’t have access to
clean sources of energy. Furthermore, they note that in Nigeria 55% of the population continue
to depend on charcoal, rewood, biomass and animal waste as their main sources of energy for
cooking and heating, which “signi es that Nigerians are climbing down the energy rungs” (ibid,
p. 243). Such reliance is de nitely against the grain, especially as nations around the world, are
seeking for alternate energy sources to combat climate change and global warming, however, the
capacity to catch up and begin the process of sourcing for new energy sources, such as wind or
solar, especially for commercial utilization; continues to be hindered as a result of “poor
leadership and weak governance” (ibid, p.246).

In Nigeria, the impact of the lack of investment in national infrastructure is mostly felt in the
rural communities. In recognition of the reality that 70% of the population resides in rural
settlements, Johnson and Ifeoma (2018 p.241), argue that “regrettably these rural sectors of
Nigeria that are vital to the socio-economic development of the nation are faced with the
problem of retard development. This has been attributed to the top down approach policies of
most Nigerian government to rural development”.

These rural communities and regions are where the raw materials such as cocao, palm oil, gold,
gas, amongst an array of natural resources, of the nation are deposited. Evidently, the magnitude
and signi cance of these localities cannot be exaggerated. Unfortunately (as earlier noted), rural
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excluded and marginalized, as they don’t have access to the most basic of infrastructures. The
lack of investment in these regions remains the greatest failure of successive Nigerian
governments. According to the Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP, 2005
p.1), rural dwellers constantly “experience insecurity and vulnerability (drought, deserti cation,
ooding, deforestation, diseases, volatile commodity markets, etc); lack of empowerment to
in uence public policies according to their priorities; and lack of opportunities for income
generation and bene ts from markets”.

In Nigeria, the inability of the Federal Government to ful ll its most basic duties and functions
continues to be the main reason why people chose to engage and integrate themselves within
spaces of informality. For instance, the fact that in the 21st century, a signi cant proportion of the
public don’t have access to basic amenities and infrastructures such as education, healthcare,
good roads and telecommunication systems; remains a serious cause for concern; and those
saddled with bearing this brunt are the young men and women of the nation, driven to the brink
by incessant marginalization and social exclusion; thrust upon them by an unruly set of corrupt
political elites. In an article published by Accountable Nigeria (2020) attention is drawn to bleak
reality, which noted that “the Nigerian youth has been relegated to a mere spectator role in the
scheme of things. Jobless, frustrated and majority, hopeless about the country. They are told to go
to school to become better humans, yet they are frustrated everyday in their respective
institutions. They are products of institutional decay and inactions, government nonchalance and
systemic rot. A vast majority are now recognized cybercriminals, poor role models, glori ed
thieves, and street urchins and thugs for their complicit principals - usually politicians”.
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communities - which are the foundation and lifeline of urban cities such as Lagos - continue to be

The Status of Youth in Society:
There is global consensus that the youth population remains the greatest asset which a nation
possesses, due to the recognition that they remain the backbone of society. According to Onyekpe
(2007, p. 78), “the youth are the most important segment of the population of any society. Apart
from being the owners and leaders of the future, they are numerically superior to the middle and
the aged… they have a lot of energy and ideas. Their energy and ideas are society’s greatest
potentials. These potentials of energy and ideas are latent and redundant until they are accessed
and mobilized for development and social progress”.

Enshrined in the Nigerian Youth Policy (2019, p. 28-29) is the acknowledgment by the Federal
Government that “the growing population of youth has ampli ed the need to acquire highquality education and skills to contribute to a productive economy, as well as access to a job
market that can absorb them into its labor force. The dividends can only become a reality if the
country invests heavily in young people’s education and health, and protect their rights, and
strategically equip them to seize opportunities for meaningful jobs and other income earning
opportunities”.

Additionally, education remains the greatest gift which can be offered to young people. This
stems from the realization that education serves as the foundation upon which young people are
afforded the opportunity to strive and work towards the successful actualization of their nascent
dreams and aspirations; which also provides an escape from the clutches of destitution and
poverty. According to Idris et al (2011, p.444), “education is the key to move the world, seek
better jobs and ultimately succeed in life. Education is the best investment for the people because
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well educated people enjoy respect among their colleagues and they can effectively contribute to
the development of their country and society by inventing new devices and discoveries. The main
purpose of education is to educate individuals within society, to prepare and qualify them for
work in economy as well as to integrate people into society and teach them values and morals of
society”. This is particularly of importance in this digital age, which continues to not only
transform, but revolutionize the socio-economic and political landscape which we inhabit.

The capacity for young people to work and strive towards the materialization of their hopes,
dreams and aspirations; is fundamental contingent on the support provided by that State, by
means of guaranteeing that the safety of the environment and space which they occupy.
According to Taggart (2003), “for much of the last century, it was taken for granted in many
countries that it was the duty of the State to care for its citizens ‘from cradle to grave’. To provide
education, pensions, medical services and public utilities; and to hold out a safety ned for the less
fortunate so that they had food, shelter, and the other necessaries of life”.

Furthermore, forward thinking States around the world are all too aware of the dire
consequences and rami cations of failing to protect and safeguard the interests of their youth
population, and cater to their socio-economic development and political empowerment. Yusuf
(2019, p. 222) notes that “that when society becomes a tool for marginalizing youth, when society
fails to protect the interest of its youth and abandons them to the fringes and mercies of poverty,
inequality, alienation, an absence of quality education, and unemployment, then radicalization,
involvement in violent acts and extremism will ensue”.
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the world continue to take steps towards formulating and implementing policies which are geared
towards the facilitation of the socio-economic and political development and empowerment of
their youth populations. This is the major reason why they are compelled to invest heavily in
critical infrastructures; such as education, sports and recreation and social care. For instance, the
United States Department of Education (2020) has investments north of US$500 million in
support quali cations associated with Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics
(STEM). Comparatively in 2018, the European Union (EU), collectively spent over €50 billion on
sports and recreational activities geared towards their youth population (eurostat, 2020).

The Radicalization of the Nigerian Youth
Re ecting on an article written by Ighoeli (2016) in which he stated that “the Nigerian youth is
amongst the brightest, resilient and is a born trailblazer. Like Archimedes, give him a place to
stand and he will move the world”, the question which remains to be answer is: why have the
Nigerian youth - for all his/her brilliance - not able to move the world? Thankfully, he provides
an answer: “the Nigerian youth, no doubt, has largely been marginalized. He has become made
to feel so inconsequential in the scheme of things … he has become a chicken, happy to peck at
the feed thrown at him by those who marginalize him whereas he ought to rule the skies!
Honestly, the marginalization is deliberate! First, they are denied access to quality education, a
tool with which they can make better decisions for themselves and their community… even with
the education and the skill, they are still denied access to a number of opportunities, such as
nance, soft loans, quality healthcare and housing. These obstacles majorly leaf to shattered
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In recognition of the pivotal position of young men and women in society, governments around

dreams, which in turn rewire the thinking of the youth propelling them into a life of crime and
despondency”.

This is perhaps the biggest existential crisis facing a nation where approximately 70% of the
population is below the age of 30 (Fayehun & Isiugo-Abanihe, 2020). Neglected in a state of
despondency and frustration, the Nigerian youth often turn to drugs as a means to escape the
pain and suffering they are forced to wrestle with on a daily basis. A study conducted by Jatau,
Sha’aban, Gulma, et al (2021), revealed that “in Nigeria, the burden of drug abuse is on the rise
and becoming a public health concern. Nigeria has developed a reputation as a center for drug
traf cking and usage mostly among the youth population”. More speci cally, attention was
drawn to the fact that “a prevalence of 20-40% and 20.9% of drug abuse was reported among
students and youth, respectively. Commonly abused drugs include cannabis, cocaine,
amphetamine, heroin, diazepam, codeine, cough syrup and tramadol. Also, studies have shown
that over 50% of persons with drug abuse-related psychiatric admission were secondary school
students” (ibid, 2021). To make matters worse, rather than investing in the socio-economic and
political development and empowerment of the youth population, those in positions of power
continue to play an active role in facilitating and in uencing the decisions of young men and
women to engage and integrate within spaces of informality. According to Eneji and Ikeorji
(2018, p.9), “many youth in Nigeria are exploited by the older political elites who use them as a
climbing ladder to attain their own political ambitions. On the other hand, young people see
violence as a last resort to create their own spaces within the political arena. Young women and
men are using their creativity and agency to create their own spaces for action in which they try
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to subvert authority, bypass the encumbrances created by the state, and fashion new ways of
functioning and maneuvering on their known”.

Chabal (2013, p. 132) explains that “the failure of the state to perform its basic functions and, in
particular, to ensure the delivery of primary services opens up an in nite number of possibilities
for the informal sector”. The emergence of terrorist groups and organizations, such as Boko
Haram are prime examples of such openings; attracting and recruiting young people, particularly
in the Northern axis of the nation. According to Meagher (2014, p. 1), “economic
marginalization” and “the profound poverty and deprivation affecting the Muslim north of
Nigeria”, which successive governments have been unable to arrest, remains the “critical factor”
as to why Boko Haram, and other emerging terrorist organizations continue to attract youths in
the North East and North West regions of the country, where the levels of poverty is
approximately 40% than in the Southern axis of the nation (ibid, 2014). In agreement to this
point, Yusuf (2019, p.222), notes that the reason why youths associate and integrate themselves
within criminal activities and nefarious groups stems from the fact that they “are reacting to the
socio-economic injustice and marginalization meted on them by the society. Their exposure to
this extreme dif cult socio-economic situation have rendered them vulnerable to recruitment by
extremist elements”. Owing to this critical factor, it is no surprise to learn the unfortunate and
tragic outcome, that the youth population “still constitute huge percentage in facilitating different
sorts of violent acts in Nigeria, including farmer-herder con ict, militant vandalizations and
Boko Haram insurgency… Youths in Nigeria have been attributed to all sorts of evils. No social
problems is devoid of a youth in this country. This has been seen as youth reacting to the socioeconomic injustice and marginalization meted on them by the society” (ibid, p.220 & p.222).
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The unemployment and underemployment rate amongst the youth population in Nigeria is a
testament to this marginalization. Ajufo (2013, p.308), opines that “unemployment has become a
major problem bedeviling the lives of Nigerian youth causing frustration, dejection and
dependency. The high rate of unemployment among the youth in Nigeria has contributed to the
high rate of poverty and insecurity in the country”. According to gures obtained from the
Nigeria Bureau of Statistics (2020, p.35), “a combination of unemployment and
underemployment rates shows that those aged between 15 - 24 reported a combined rate of
71.3%, showing a serious challenge for the age group in secure full-time employment. Female
unemployment was highest among the genders with 31.6% while male was 22.9%. A similar case
was recorded for underemployment, 31.0% was reported for females, while males reported an
underemployment rate of 22.6%”.

The neglect of the education sector is another avenue use and illustrate the extent at which
youths are marginalized. According to Odia and Omofonmwan (2007, p.81) “education in
Nigeria is bisected with myriads of problems. These includes, poor funding and thus poor
educational infrastructures, inadequate classrooms, teaching aids (projectors, computers,
laboratories and libraries), paucity of quality teachers and poor/polluted learning environment.
In addition to these inadequacies, our school system is plagued with numerous social vices such as
examination malpractices, cultism, hooliganism and corruption”. In agreement with the views
espoused above, Ekundayo (2019), draws attention to the reality that Nigeria “has over 10 million
out of school children. That’s the highest in the world. Another 27 million children in school are
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performing very poorly. Millions of Nigerians are half-educated, or over 60 million - or 30% - are
illiterate”.

The failure of the Federal Government to invest in the education sector serves as another
prominent example of marginalization and social exclusion of the youth population. This was
made evident in the 2021 national budget presented to the National Assembly (the legislature) by
President Muhammadu Buhari’s administration, in which out of the NGN13.08 trillion
(US$31,752,183,960) budgeted for the scal year, only NGN742 million (US$1,805,500,362) 5.6% of the total budget - was allocated to the Ministry of Education (Fatunmole, 2020); whilst
NGN181,104,352,485 (US$440,570,000) was allocated to the Ministry of Youth and Sport
Development (Usman, 2020). It is important to note that the allocation for the education sector is
far below the recommendation of UNESCO (2020), which has urged “states to allocate at least
4-6% of GDP and/or at 15%-20% of public expenditure to education”.

Furthermore, the systematic and sporadic strike actions waged by Nigeria teachers, under the
aegis of Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), against the Federal Government serves
to illustrate the extent at which the youth population continues to suffer marginalization and
neglect. Since 1999 - 22 years ago - it is noted that Nigerian teachers have gone on strike a total
of 15 times. The last strike action, which took place in 2020 lasted for over 9 months. According
to Yusuf (2020), these strike actions are the result of “the incessant face-off between the federal
government and the striking academic union workers around the context of poor funding in the
education sector lackadaisical attitude of the government to implement negotiated agreements
with the union”. Whilst acknowledging the need for teachers to express their opposition against

fi

47

the inaction of the state, it has to be recognized that those who bear the brunt are the youths,
who are seeking to gain quality education. According to Peterside (2020), the incessant strike
actions has ultimately led to the “watering down the quality of education offered to Nigerian
students which has at best been mediocre. The academic performance of students is adversely
affected, and the entire educational system is almost crippled. These result in half-baked students
and graduates who are unemployable and who lack the basic skills necessary to survive dynamic
environments like Nigeria and the rest of the world”.

As a direct result of the Federal Government’s ignorance and negligence of education system,
secondary and tertiary institutions have become the breeding ground for nefarious activities and
violent associations such as cultism. According to Gboyega (2005, p. 39), “Nigeria, has witnessed
unprecedented violent behaviors occasioned by students’ involvement in campus cultism. Peace
on campus has been shattered due to this development of violent behavior. Blood letting arising
from either murder or manslaughter has become pervasive”. Young people often make the
(ir)rational decision to join cult groups at either secondary school or universities because of the
following: (I) need for protection; (ii) economic and nancial bene ts; (iii) exerting authority and
supremacy; (iv) lack of guidance and direction; (v) peer pressure; (vi) in uence of politicians and
school administration and; (vii) deplorable school facilities; amongst other factors (Ajotoni and
Olaniyan, 2018 p. 261).

The challenges associated with the education sector is further compounded by the failure of the
Federal Government to ensure and guarantee the protection and safety of students. The recent
in ltration of the Nigerian Defense Academy (NDA), which is described as “Nigeria’s foremost
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military university” by bandits and unknown gunsmen, which resulted in the abduction of a
Major, and the killing of two military of cers, is just an example of how the government has
failed to protect its citizenry. According to Iwara (2021), “Since December 2020, criminal gangs
have emulated Boko Haram’s tactic - committing over 10 mass abductions, totaling more than
1,000 schoolchildren, to extort ransoms across northern Nigeria. Many smaller attacks go
unreported. The violence is only deepening a years-old educational crisis that bas been worse for
northern Nigerians - and for girls. The erosion of education for a generation of school children
in the north will reduce their abilities to earn a living and bring skills to the reconstruction of
their communities. It will increase their risk of being radicalized amid the region’s con icts”.

Unfortunately, the response from those in positions of authority to these catastrophic events have
been grossly unsatisfactory. For instance, the Minister of Defense, Bashir Magashi (2021) told
Nigerians, “it is the responsibility of everybody to keep alert and to nd safety when necessary.
But we shouldn’t be cowards. At times, the bandits will only come with three rounds of
ammunition, when they re shots everybody runs. In our younger days, we stand to ght any
aggression coming for us. I don’t know why people are running from minor things like that. They
should stand and let these people know that even the villagers have the competency and
capabilities to defend themselves”. Maintaining the same train of thought as the Minister of
Defense, the Governor of Katsina State Aminu Bello Masari (2021) urged that Nigerians “must
intensify prayers with clean minds to seek God’s forgiveness and intervention. We must all rise up
to counter the insecurity challenge, we must not seat and watch some people buying guns
attacking our houses, we too should buy the guns and protect ourselves”. Such remarks from an
incumbent Minister of Defense and Governor, makes it abundantly clear, by proving that those
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in positions of authority have abdicated, ceded and surrendered their constitutional duties and
responsibilities to the populace.

Whilst such loose remarks beg numerous questions, the overarching conclusion is that the Federal
Government can neither ensure nor guarantee the safety of the nation. More importantly, when
high ranking government of cials ask the citizenry to take up arms in order to protect themselves,
albeit from terrorist, such actions have the serious potential to open the oodgates to anarchy and
mob-rule, which would, for all intent and purposes, plunge Nigeria - the Giant of Africa - into a
domain of a failed state. Despite the insurmountable challenges bedeviling a nation such as
Nigeria, Ostrom et al (1989, p. 175) draws attention to “the fact that social life has not totally
disintegrated even under the impact of the most repressive regimes implies that small-scale
organization that allows people to maintain some of the most basic functions exists everywhere”.

Responding to Marginalization
According to Azarya and Chazan (1987 p.106 - 107), upon the realization that the State, which
was once viewed as “primary vehicle for integration and consolidation” has transitioned and
reformed itself “to be seen as the arena of con ict, different groups vying for control over its
apparatus”,the citizenry adopts certain mechanisms to convey their discontent against the
excesses of the state. One of such mechanism is Suffer-Manage. This involves “an array of
activities aimed at reconciliation to a declining standard of living and learning to manage in
these circumstances” (ibid, p.116).
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at the station. In response to these circumstances, on a personal level, it is pertinent on the
individual to make some personal adjustment. For instance, rather than eating 3 square meals,
food intake would reduce to 2 meals a day; or instead of driving (or hailing a taxi) to work, the
sacri ce to make might involve trekking the distance to get to required destination; or if medical
attention is required, rather than visit the hospital, individuals would revert and seek out the help
of traditional healers. During such periods of uncertainty, it is often the case rather than go to
work, individuals devote their time and effort on searching for food supplies to ensure and
guarantee their survival. Accordingly, Azarya and Chaza notes that, “dissatisfaction with existing
conditions and with the prospects for amelioration has become commonplace, breeding a studied
aloofness from affairs of government and a skepticism vis-a-vis the machination of its leaders.

The suffer-manage syndrome re ects the reaction of those who are unable to extricate
themselves from the arena of a malfunctioning state. The essential passivity intrinsic to this
approach serves as an indicator of both the extent to which people are willing to reconcile
themselves to diminishing circumstances and the degree to which other possibilities are
foreclosed” (ibid, 117-18).

Another mechanism of disengagement adopted in the face of dif cult situations is Escape. In
contrast with the Suffer-Managers who chose to come to terms with the adverse conditions they
nd themselves in, “those opting for escape remove themselves not only for the site but from the
country as a whole” (ibid, p.118) no matter the cost.
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This mechanism is adopted during periods of scarcity, such as food material in the market or gas

The most prominent example are stories of citizens (in their hundreds or thousands) from nations
- particularly on the African or Latin American continents - taking the gamble of selling all their
belongings and property, in order to obtain a ticket and endure the most breathtaking, and
unthinking routes, just to attempt to touch the shores of Europe or the United States.
Furthermore, this method of disengagement often results in a brain-drain, which has “affected
both urban and rural groups. It has wrecked havoc in the standards of the service sectors,
curtailed agricultural and industrial production, and limited the development of human
resources. Educational investment by the states have been wasted as so many bene ciaries chose
not to use their skill in their own countries” (ibid, p. 121).
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Methodology
The main objective of the literature review was geared towards attempting to understand what
the informal economy and certain push and pull factors which continues to inform the decision
of people to engage within spaces of informality. Drawing upon a wide array of publications
authored by highly esteemed academic scholars and policymakers, we’ve embarked on
challenging and questioning our understanding of what we understand as the informal economy.
In order to ascertain the authenticity, credibility and validity of the viewpoints espoused in the
publications analyzed and reviewed, this thesis sets out to conduct an in-depth eldwork study, in
order to gain rst hand information as to ‘how’ and ’why’ the informal economy continues to
grow and thrive, particularly in resource rich nations situated in the global south.

The site chosen to conduct this analysis and investigation of the informal economy is Gishiri, a
community village with a population of approximately 4,000. Gishiri is situated in Abuja, the
capital of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The main objective here was observe the vast range
of activities undertaken by the youths alongside the strategies which they employ in order to
navigate their way through this space to ultimately ensure and guarantee their survival.

The youths living in Gishiri were chosen as the focus for this research study for two main reasons.
The rst reason was based on the recognition that they constituted the most marginalized and
oppressed segment of the population Nigeria. With this in mind, it was critically important to
engage and interact with this pivotal group to shed light on the socio- economic and political
challenges which they are forced to wrestle with on a daily basis; alongside the actions and
processes which they employ in order to maneuver and navigate them. The second reason is
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based on the genuine and profound attempt to give a voice to this marginalized group, who were
very desperate and eager to share their their experiences and stories - with an atom of faith and
hope that maybe someone would hear their pleas and supplications and render assistance in
order to alleviate their misery.
Conducting this research in Gishiri was dependent on obtaining the approval to carry out this
research in Gishiri and for the permission for youths to participate in this study. For this reason, a
courtesy visit was paid to two in uential gures within the community. Seeking information about
my intention, the parameters and scope of this research, they were briefed on the objective of the
research. In order to gain their assurance and con dence, they were informed that this study
posed no harm to those who would partake as I also stressed the fact that under no circumstances
would any con dential information about those who participate in this study be shared with any
of the authorities. Their personal information, such as their given birth names; home and work
addresses; and other details would neither be obtained nor required from the respondents who
willingly participate in this study.
Furthermore, attention was drawn to the strict guidelines this research is adhering to; as
stipulated in the Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects. If they had
any further questions or inquiries, they were provided with my contacts details to reach me
whenever they could. Additionally, a request was made to introduce me to someone within the
community who would serve as a guide to navigate the terrain of Gishiri, and also help to recruit
individuals willing to participate in this study. The requirement was for 25 to 30 (both male and
female) individuals, between the ages of 16 to 27; from different ethnic and tribal groups and
religious groups to participate in this study.
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The approval to carry out this research was granted when Yakubu, a 24 year old student at the
University of Abuja, reached out via phone and invited me to Gishiri to discuss further about the
nature of the study which I required assistance to undertake in Gishiri. During our conversation,
he mentioned the fact that he is one of the ‘youth leaders’ in the community, and we proceeded
towards walking around the community village, as we engaged in conversation about Gishiri.
During our conversation, I sought his assistance to secure the venue where the interaction would
take place within Gishiri.
A total 22 respondents (16 male and 6 female) - including the youth leader - contributed and
participated this study. All the individuals who took part in this study were between the ages of 16
and 26; they were all Nigerians, originating from different ethnic and tribal groups. They all
resided in Gishiri. Although the sample size is small, the intent here was to ensure that the
respondents conveyed the diverse character of the youth population existing and settling in this
peculiar space.

Owing to the fact that this is a qualitative research study, the method of engagement with the
youths was carried out in the form of semi-structured interviews, which began with a series of
open-ended questions for the respondents. This is the best approach for this type of engagement
due to the fact that it provided them with the opportunity to be at the driving seat, and also to
enable them fully express themselves at great lengths without much constraint.
Two sets of interviews and interactive sessions were conducted with the respondents who partook
in this study. The rst set took place in the form of a focus group. This was attended by 12
respondents (7 male and 5 female), which lasted more than 4 hours. The other set of interviews
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were conducted during an impromptu investigative tour of the community, at the urging of two
of the individuals participating in the focus group session. This serves as the backdrop against
which interactions with 10 more respondents (7 male and 3 women) when we visited the local
hospital, market place, and the primary school. At the onset of each interaction with the
respondents, their attention was drawn to the fact whilst our conversation was to be recorded and
transcribed; they would remain anonymous, and pseudonyms would be used in order to protect
their identity, as was guaranteed in the ascent and consent forms they were required to sign
before partaking in this study. The data and information obtained during our conversations
would be deleted following the conclusion of this project.
The interviews with the respondents were conducted in both English and Pidgin. In some cases
during the focus group session, were the respondents didn’t have a strong command of either
English or Pidgin, the youth leader stepped in and acted as the translator from English to Hausa
(and vice-versa). This was the situation with 4 of the respondents who took part in this study.
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Findings & Analysis
The Informal Space:
Obi (2020) describes Gishiri as a place “where poverty, af uence meets”. This stems from the fact
that this locality, which some may argue “epitomizes squalor and degradation” (ibid, 2020); is
situated right in the middle of the wealthiest neighborhood in Abuja; namely, Katampe,
Maitama and Wuse II; alongside its very close proximity to the Central Business District (CBD)
of the nation’s capital. From the perspective of an outsider, attempting to make sense of the the
vast range informal socio-economic activities and transactions taking place across what can be
best described as the perilous and tumultuous terrain of Gishiri is nothing short of an audacious
task. This is because Gishiri gives the impression of functioning like a rudderless ship, under the
cloud of chaos and disorder - bereft of any form of coordination or direction. However, upon
taking a closer look, one begins to recognize the subtle enigmatic and tactical protocols which
governs this space, and the activities which transpires along these terrains.

The most signi cant group in Gishiri are migrants from the Northern axis of the nation, who
have situated themselves in this community village after eeing from to the waves of insurgencies
and terrorist attacks which continues to engulf their states. For example, Adamu, from Borno
State, spoke of how his parents took the decision to move he and his younger brother to live with
their uncle so they would not be recruited by the Boko Haram. Charity from Benue State, also
shared how her mother and siblings sought refugee in Gishiri in 2020 after Fulani herdsmen
invaded their village, which led to the unfortunate demise of her father who was trying to protect
his family farm from the invading terrorists.
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Beggers (panhandlers), newspaper vendors, okada (motorcycle) and keke-napep (tricycles) drivers,
bricklaying, food sellers, provisions kiosk managers, makeshift garages, car wash out ts, cloth
sellers, carpenters, mechanics, drug dealing on corners, etc. These are some of the activities,
services and transactions constantly taking place across diverse spaces of informality in Gishiri.
According to Laguerre (1994, p.2), people situate themselves in spaces of informality “in order to
deal effectively with the routine issues of everyday life”. These are the spaces where both young
and old; the handicapped; educated and uneducated; employed and underemployed and
unemployed; amongst other groups of peoples, converge upon with a single goal: to

nd

opportunities which would provide them with a source of income. The majority of the activities
taking place along the terrain of informality space are commandeered by young men and
women, driven by their desire to seek avenues in order to guarantee their livelihoods.

Although these public spaces (the land which they operate on) are usually under the direct
jurisdiction of the local authorities, it is fascinating to observe and watch the intuitive and
intelligent manner in which informal actors position and reappropriate public spaces. The
positioning of okada and keke-napep drivers; and the carwash station in Gishiri also serve as
good examples. Owing to the fact that the deplorable conditions of the roads, it is often the case
that people often make the rational decision not to drive into Gishiri (alongside their knowledge
that taxi drivers always refuse to enter because of fear of their vehicle being stuck in potholes);
the options available is to hail either a okada or keke-napep to take you into Gishiri. These modes
of transportation, which operate exclusively in Gishiri are the best suited to navigate the bumpy
roads and dangerous terrain in this community. These vehicles are strategically positioned at the
junction leading into Gishiri and the market square, situated in the middle of Gishiri and also
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serves as a convergence spot for the community. Next to where these vehicles are clustered is a
carwash. For those with cars, who either live in or decide to drive into Gishiri, the chances are
that when the car would be covered in either dust or mud. Upon exiting, it might be the case that
the car needs to be washed before proceeding on your journey. Furthermore, owing to the fact
that Gishiri is situated along one of the busiest highways in the capital, and judging by the
number of cars being washed at all times of the day, it is evident that the carwash rips the most
bene ts of the strategic position it occupies in Gishiri.

Along the same sphere, it is often the case that people claim public spaces as their own possession
and territory. This was illustrated by Salisu, who narrated - in Hausa (and translated by Yakubu)
- his experience during his stint at begging at one of the corners in Gishiri. “After 2 weeks of
begging at the place I usually stay, some people who I thought were beggars like me come to me
and said that they will beat me up if I don’t leave the place I was begging. They said that I
needed to go and meet their oga (boss) for him to give me permission to beg from that place.
When I met the oga, he told me that if I want to beg, everyday I will give him 20% of my money
because that corner has belonged to him for a long time. One I heard that nonsense from his
mouth, I knew that I cannot continue like this. I had to nd another work to do, because to give
someone the money I gotten from people pitying me standing under this hot sun is impossible”.
Although this sounded absurd, it was con rmed by the youth leader, who described it as “one of
many street politics going on. You don’t know that it is a very pro table business”.
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The Agberos & Area boys:
In Nigerian society, the youths, particularly those from low income areas - are often defamed,
maligned and vili ed as ‘agberos’ (thugs) or ‘area boys’ (deviant youths), hoodlums, and thugs; the
purveyors of brutality and extreme violence who are deemed as outlaws and menaces to society,
with nothing good, positive or substantial to offer to their community. Speaking with the youths
in Gishiri, it was noted that such characterizations were not a surprise. According to Zeke, “we
don dey use to am. No be today we dey hear am for here. That one na old talk. Afta all, na your
presido wey use him mouth call us lazy shebi?” (we are very familiar with these comments, its
nothing new to us. Remember that it was the President who called us lazy, right?)”.

Whilst acknowledging the fact hat that young people often engage in criminal and nefarious
activities, Anselm sought to explain that adopting such blanket characterizations and
interpretations about the youths “would be like judging a book by its cover”. However, Anselm
claims not to hold any grudges or offense to such perceptions because “it is something experience
we everyday from people like you who are not from this side. It is nothing new. It doesn’t bother
us at all. Na so we dey take eye see am (that’s the condition we nd ourselves in). You people
would be fearing us because you think that we are cultists or part of bad gang that wants to steal
your wallet or phone. It is very funny. Even though we know of some bad people living here with
us, it is nonsense to believe that everyone is bad. I hope you know that it is foolish and stupid
thinking? Yes, we are rough riders - no be lie (the truth). Do you know what it take to survive in a
place like Gishiri? In this place, you have to pray to God to give you very tough skin, if not, you
be OYO (on your own)”.
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In agreement with the opinions of Zeke and Anselm put forward, Mustapha argued that is
should not come as a surprise that young people are forced to “do bad things in order to survive”
as he shed light on the “hopeless”circumstances which they nd themselves in. “People don’t
know - people don’t understand. what we are going through day in, day out. People don’t see the
pain we are ghting. Some people get high to calm the pain. Sometimes you cannot sleep
because you don’t know where you will get food from tomorrow. Do you know what it feels like
you don’t have a purpose in this life? Look around, and you just see people roaming around
aimlessly. You see small children who should be in school but they cannot go because their
parents cannot buy them food to eat, talk less to pay school fees. People think that we woke up
one morning and prayed to God, ‘God today, I want to join bad gang because I like to ght on
the street or that I want to grow up to become a thief for a living’. They look at us and believe
that we didn’t have the desires and ambitions to be something good? Reason am, we get chance,
you think sey we go melt for this zanga? (Think about it, if we had opportunities, do you think
you will remain in this space?).

This desire to leave - escape - the shores of Nigeria was a reoccurring theme during the course
of interacting with the youths in Gishiri. As Azarya & Chazan (1987, p.118), this is one of the
mechanisms adopted by people in response to the marginalization which they are forced to
contend in on a daily basis. As a matter of fact, all of the respondents who took part in the group
session mentioned of their wish to leave the country. Canada, Greece, the United States, the
United Kingdom, amongst other Western countries were locations which they aspired to migrate
to, because, as argued by Halliru, “for these countries, their government get sense well well” (in
these countries, governments function very well).According to Jubril, “I go do anything just to
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nd way go Libya, swim enter Jand. As you see me so, I no dey fear death at all. God forbid say
na for this place where I go stay I go born my pikin dem. Look me, e no t happen at all. God no
go gree at all” (I would do anything just to leave this country. The living conditions over here is
not worth it. I will nd a way and go to Libya. I will even swim to the UK. God forbid that this is
where my children would be born. Trust me, it cannot happen. God would not allow it to
happen).

A State of Abandonment
During our interaction, the youths vehemently expressed their lack of con dence and faith in
their elected representatives and deep-seated distrust for the police. Still fresh and ingrained in
their memories were the catastrophic, horri c and violent events of the October 2020 #endears
movement, which Samson described “when young people were slaughtered like animals for no
reason by this government”; and the government’s “wicked decision to lock palliatives for poor
people during COVID-19 lockdown, when they know that we suffering and dying”; which
youths responded to by participating in the mass looting of warehouses around the country,
which was also met with violence from the State security authorities. So when they were informed
of the government’s claim that it “recognizes and values young men and women as valuable
resources, national assets and situates their needs and aspiration at the center of national
development” (Nigerian Youth Policy, 2019 p. 22); they didn’t nd such a claim remotely funny.
This was when it became very personal.
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comot from this country. Ah ah, how person go t dey live for here? Free the matter. I go even

Describing such a claim as nothing more than “a fat and shameless lie”, Aminu drew attention to
the challenges that young people are forced to contend with on a daily basis, as he noted “as we
are here today, the truth of the matter is that most of us don’t have any good work even if some
of us went to school and graduated from university. Everyday we are just wandering the streets
aimlessly with nothing to do. We are here suffering because of lack of empowerment! Just
wasting away and you are telling me what about value? How can anybody with common sense
believe politicians when they tell you that they value and respect us the youths? The honest truth
- between God and man - is that we are seriously suffering. Wallahi, the suffering is too much”.
IT was evident that there is a disconnect between the youths and public of cials. In agreement
with the point of view Cynthia sought to make it clear that, “Don’t listen to those politicians, they
are wicked liars. We have never gotten any support from government to try and prove ourselves.
In short, it is not a secret that our government has abandoned us”.

Hassan, who ed from Zamfara State during the Boko Haram insurgency in 2015, sought to
argue that the inability to protect young people was “solid proof ” that the State does not value
young people, as he protested the fact that “we are not safe! The government say that it is their
job to protect us but just see what is happening in the North East. See what is happening in
Kaduna. See what is happening in Niger State. Everyday, you hear that 100 children, 200
children have been kidnapped by bandits and unknown gunmen. Everyday you hear that people
have been kidnapped from the Abuja-Kaduna express. Everyday it is one story or another, yet
this Buhari government continues to keep quiet and doing nothing as if they don’t know what is
happening or where these unknown gunmen are from”.
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To further illustrate the extent at which they’ve been abandoned, the youth leader; alongside two
other respondents, Aminu and Jide, insisted that I take a stroll with them to inspect rst hand, the
conditions of the infrastructure in their environment. Navigating the depilated state un-tarred
roads, which was described to as “an abomination”; the “useless” police station, which was
evidently under-funded; the neglected primary school; we brie y stopped at a makeshift hospital
building, which Jide dismissed as “nothing more than a chemist with beds”. Building up their
courage, they described an event that occurred a couple years ago, which resulted in one of the
loss of life of a close friend. Re ecting on this unfortunate event, Aminu narrated how “when we
brought him here, the nurse told us that the Doctor was not around and that there is nothing
they can do because they didn’t not have any resources to treat him. They referred us to another
hospital, but because it was night, taxis refuse to drive into Gishiri because of the bad road, they
are afraid of getting accident or getting robbed. See, I know that if we had a good hospital in
Gishiri, our guy would have been here with us today”. It was regrettable to learn that in spite of
the fact that Gishiri is in close proximity with some of the most af uent areas in the Abuja, logic
might dictate that this community village would have, at least been the recipient of some socioeconomic development or windfall trickling down from their rich neighbors. Unfortunately, this
wasn’t the case.

The Anguish of Displacement
Whilst Taggart (2003) argued that was the “duty of the State to care for its citizens ‘from cradle
to grave’”, in spaces such as Gishiri, it is evident that opposite occurs. Whilst it is the case that
informal spaces such as Gishiri functions as safe haven for individuals either seeking better
economic opportunities in Abuja, or eeing the violence emanating from their home states, the
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youths who took part in this study were eager to highlight and stress - at great pains - the insecure
and precarious circumstances of their their existence in Gishiri. According to Hassan, “when I
wake up in the morning, I thanked Allah that there is a roof over my head. When I go to the
Mosque for afternoon prayers, I pray to Allah that my house will be standing. When I come back
home in the evening, I thank Allah for being merciful that my house is still standing and pray that
I have a roof over my head tomorrow morning. I pray this blessed everyday”. The reason why
Hassan, amongst other youths - irregardless of their faith or religious beliefs - in Gishiri are
compelled to appeal and make such requests during their devotions and prayers, stems from the
real apprehension and deep-rooted fear that one day, without a moment’s notice, their dwellings
could be demolished and razed to the ground by bulldozers belonging to the local authority, the
Federal Capital Territory Administration (FCTA).

The youth leader drew attention to the most recent demolitions carried out by the FCTA in
Gishiri, which rendered 8 families homeless. The reason given by the authorities was that the
demolished structures were illegal, because they were not consistent with the master plan of
Abuja, hence it had to be razed to the ground. One of the respondents, Jemima, who is a victim
of this sort of this demolition exercise carried out by the FCDA expressed her shock when she
saw armed men and a bulldozer at the place she had worked since May 2020. According to
Jemima, “we all know that demolition is not a new thing. Everybody here knows the buildings
that are marked for demolition. What they usually do is that they will mark your fence with red
paint. The place where we used to plate hair, they did not give any notice at all. They just came
with bulldozer and told us that in the next 1 hour they will start demolishing - whether or not
anybody was around. My madam cried, begged and even started rolling of the oor. All the girls
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begged, we begged till we were tired. We called the landlord, but his put his phone off. Before we
knew what was going on, they switch on the bulldozer. That was when we entered the shop to
start removing our property. That day, they almost killed my madam. She stayed in hospital for 2
weeks”.

After hearing about Jemima’s lived experience, it was incumbent to ask the group if any
compensation was given to the businesses and families affected by these demolition exercises
taking place in their community by the governing authorities or their representatives.
Immediately this question was posed, the expression on the faces of the respondents was nothing
short of striking. Some burst into a t of laughter; whilst others turned their gaze towards my
direction with astonishment and bewilderment.

Adamu, who spoke in Hausa, was evidently puzzled by this line of questioning and asked the
youth leader to ask, “where does he think he is? This is not abroad. Has anybody ever heard of
government giving anybody compensation for anything? As you were entering here, didn’t you
see that they are building estates? Those people (estate companies) have bribed government to
take our land. We cannot expect anything from them. Even if there is compensation, the FCDA
people will not give us, instead they will eat it”. The dire circumstances described by Jemima and
Adamu was shown to me by the youth leader, who pointed out the buildings which were marked
with X in red paint, for demolition and those which had been reduced to rubble. As we surveyed
this environment, I was introduced to Stanley, a resident of Gishiri for over 10 years, whose house
was brought down by the FCDA. During our interaction, Stanley described how dif cult it has
been for him ever since the demolition of his house.“When they gave me 2 months notice, me
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time. They would tell us not to worry, that government will give us money to nd a new place. It's
been 9 months now and I have not seen even 1k (kobo). Whenever you call them, they will shout
at you and tell you to stop harassing them. No pity at all. As you see me, I’m an orphan. My
parents have died since. I have no brothers and sisters with me. If not for God and my friends
who I’ve been staying with, I don’t know what would have happened to me. I swear, the stress is
too much”.

Pipe Dreams
Perhaps the greatest challenge af icting young people of working age was the lack of socioeconomic and political empowerment, which they desperately sought in order to enable them
ight against the claws poverty. In Gishiri, the respondents draw attention to the fact that they are
unable to access to good schools and nd quality jobs that would give them a strong foundation.
Yetunde re ected on her desire was to become a Medical Doctor as she recalled, “when I was
very young, I used to spend a lot of time in the hospital with my mother who used to be sick all
the time. By the time I was 7 or 8, I decided that I would to become a Medical Doctor and
promised my mother that I would treat her when she was ill or sick”. Following suit, Ade who
described himself as “the best player in Gishiri” noted that for as long as he could remember, his
desire was to become a footballer. “I use to follow my father and brothers to one bar close to our
house to watch football. At that time JayJay Okocha and Kanu Nwankwo were the biggest
players in Nigeria. I liked their style of play and wanted to be like them. After school would
nish, me and my classmates will play ball outside till night come. I wanted to play for Nigeria
and Arsenal”. Abdul also shared about his fascination and intrigue with airplanes as he noted
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and my other neighbors will go to their of ce almost everyday and beg them to give us more

that “when I was much younger, I would lie on the glass, then wait and watch as they y through
the sky like birds. My family thought that I wanted to be a pilot, but the truth is that I would like
to become an engineer and study about aerodynamics and physics in university Inshallah (If God
wills it)”.

Regrettably, these individuals are nowhere close towards the materialization of these goals.
Rather than medical school, Yetunde works as a shopkeeper in a makeshift kiosk in Gishiri; Ade
works as bricklayer, rather than attending sports college; and Abdul works as a carpenter, rather
than being enrolled in University. These menial jobs are the only options they have in order to
ensure their survival. According to Ade, when he dropped out of senior secondary school due to
the inability of his family to pay his school fees, “my uncle, who is a pastor at our church always
preached to me at home at an idle mind is the devil’s workshop, so he helped me nd this
bricklayer work 2 years ago. The work is very hard, but its work and I’m now good at it. At least,
I don’t need to stand on the street and beg strangers for money just to eat”. Yetunde, the oldest
daughter of her single mother, drew attention to the fact that due to her mother’s deteriorating
health, she could not afford to register for secondary school. As a result, she had to step up to the
plate become in charge of her mother’s small kiosk in order to pay for medical expenses.

The Traumas of Unemployment
As noted in the literature review, unemployment and underemployment remains a major
problem facing the youth population in Nigeria. In spite of the fact that an individual possessed
either education certi cates or references to vouch that they harnesses the experience and skills
needed to obtain a good paying job, their search towards attaining employment has been futile.
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Rufai who graduated with a degree in environmental science from the University of Abuja in
2019, narrated how “since graduation, I cannot count how many of ces I have visited to submit
my CV. I graduated with a rst class in environmental science, yet some of these of ces will not
even consider to interview you. They will tell you, no vacant. Other places will give you hope that
they will call you. It is who you know that will help you. In fact, I have even given people money
to put my name at the top of their list for simple consideration. It is very tiring”. He also noted
that when he rst began the application process, owing to the degree he had obtained, he was
expecting a job that would fetch him between N150,000 (US$365) to N200,000 (US$486) a
month; however, “omo, as we day so, if I see job do for N50,000 (US$121) to N70,000 (US$170),
I go take am” (my friend, due to the circumstances, if I see any job paying N50,000 to N70,000; I
will accept).

Even when an individual has “work”, it was often the case that their daily wages were extremely
inadequate and insuf cient. Yusuf, a painter in Wuse II explained how whenever he complains to
his employer about his wages of N500 (US$1.21c) an hour, he was often met with the threat of
dismissal if he continued to raise the matter; as he was reminded that the streets are lled with
people who would be grateful to receive wages of even N400 (US$0.97) in this economic climate.
In order to illustrate his predicament, Yusuf sought to provided a breakdown of how much he
spends on a daily basis. Assuming that after working for 10 hours on a given day, by the close of
business, he is expected to take home approximately N5,000 (US$12.). Before he arrives home,
he branches the market to buy some food items for dinner and breakfast, which could cost him
anything between N700 (US$1.70) to N1,000 (US$1,000) - depending on how well he haggles
with the kiosk attendant. By the time he arrives at the place he stays, he and his neighbors are
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mandated to contribute approximately N600 (US$1.46) for their use of electricity. Prior to
retiring for the night, he checks and measures the amount of water in his big drum. If he deems
it necessary to replenish the water drum, he is going to have to pay approximately N700
(US$1.70) to the water vendor; and another N200 (US$0.48) for the transportation to his house.
When he wakes up the next morning, he notes that whether or not he takes a cold or hot shower
is dependent on the weather. If he requires hot water, he has to take water in bucket to one of his
neighbor’s house, who would boil his water for N50 (US$). As he heads to work in the early
morning, he stops to buy N500 (US$1.21) top-up and N200 (US$0.48) data for his phone; and to
test his luck, he gambles N500 (US$1.21) at the NaijaBet store, in hopes of cashing out on the
days football matches (he has never won). The transportation cost from Gishiri to Wuse II would
is approximately N400 (US$0.97). Drawing attention to the increasing costs in virtually all sectors
of the Nigerian economy, Yusuf notes

that roughly 6 months ago, he used to pay okada

(motorcycle) N50 (US$0.12) from his house to the junction, now, he has to pay N100 (US$0.24).

In agreement with Yusuf ’s assertion, Miriam, highlighted the fact that the costs which Yusuf has
outlined doesn’t take into consideration other costs associated with rent; health emergencies;
monies dispensed to family members and friends; social contributions for the night watch men
patrolling their community during the night time; amongst other spendings associated with living
in Gishiri. This prompted Yusuf to ask a simple, yet thought provoking question: “how you t say
make we survive? Because before you know wetin day happen, the money don japa” (How do
you expect us to survive? Before you are able to nd your bearings, the money has nished). In
the course of trying to process Yusuf ’s and Miriam’s input, another respondent, Jide, chimed in
and said, “omo guy, for us wey be youths, we gats hustle for this streets in you wan chop oooo.
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This one na man-o-man. Nobody dey look our face at all. Na between God and us” (my friend,
for the youths, our only option is to hustle in the streets if you want to eat. It’s all about survival
of the ttest. Nobody cares about your daily struggles. Only God watches us”).

Government Steady Scheming
Upon hearing about their experiences, I was compelled to inquire about the welfare support and
grants from the federal government, such as the distribution of cash to poor households by the
Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs under its N-Power program; and the Ministry of
Labor’s disbursement of N20,000 (US$48) to unemployed youths for a period of 3 months, in
conjunction with the ministry’s Special Works Program (SPW) scheme to employ 774,000 youths.
Although all the respondents admitted that they know about the existence of program and
schemes presented by both ministries, 7 of them acknowledged that they had registered for the
grants by the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs; however, only had 4 had received any sort of
cash transfer payment. In order to apply for either of these schemes, an individual must possess a
Bank Veri cation Number (BVN), which is provided when opening a bank account. Only 9 of
the respondents had owned bank account.. However, because these schemes were introduced
during the COVID pandemic, the youth leader noted that it almost impossible for many people
to access these federal grants, because they needed to visit banks in order to open an account.
However, they were shut. Owing to such reasons, people sought to nd seek alternatives to bypass
this BVN hurdle. For instance, one of the respondents narrated how he attempted to apply for
the Ministry of Labor’s scheme by engaging someone with a bank account. However, there was a
caveat: if he was going to apply on his behalf, he would agree to a fee of N5,000 (US$12) out of
the N20,000 that would be deposited into his account during the 3 months period. However,
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others such as Chinwe, dismissed the disbursement of these funds as government as “useless”,
because “you cannot buy anything with that amount in the market again. The cost of living
keeps on increasing”. In agreement with Chinwe’s point, Matthew described this disbursement as
“appeasement” and “an insult", as he sought to argue that the youths are not looking for “any
nonsense handout from the government. What we want is empowerment. The should go and x
our schools so that we can learn. If you see the state of our universities, you will be sorry for us.
You cannot learn anything. To pass and graduate, you have to drop cash (pay bribe)”.

The Survivalists, Hustlers & Professionals
During the course of observing the activities taking place across this terrain, three main groups
of young informal actors were identi ed: (I) the survivalists; (II) the hustlers; and (III) the
professionals (aka the big boys). Ironically, regardless of which category they fall into, the youth
leader explained that the individuals working in informal spaces have the capacity to earn more
money than if they were employed in formal economy. This is because compared with the
national minimum wage of N30,000 (US$73) per month, the youth leader argued that
“depending on how people position themselves here, they can make that amount in a less than
day”.

The survivalists engage in activities such as, begging, hawking and vending newspapers along the
street in order to sustain themselves. This is were migrants usually nd themselves when they rst
arrive at Gishiri. These individuals are guaranteed to make approximately N36,000 at the end of
each month. For example, Salisu, who currently works as an okada driver and as a mechanic
apprentice in Gishiri, noted that “begging was the only thing I could when I rst came to Gishiri
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because I didn’t not know anybody. I did it for about 6 months. When I came, I did not know
anybody at all, I started to beg on this same street we are standing today. It was the only way I
could eat. At least everyday, I would collect at least N1,500 (US$3.65) - N2,000 (US$4.86). I
remember one day, I collected N4,000 (US$9.73). But there were times when I collected N500
(US$1.21).

The hustlers, refers to individuals who are either unemployed or underemployed (side hustlers).
Although these individuals might have work from the formal economy, their take home pay is
usually insuf cient, and as a result, they seek work from the informal economy in order to
augment their income. The youth leader introduced me to Eze, who lives in with uncle in Gishiri.
When he dropped out of secondary school (JSS3) due to the inability of his family to pay his
school fees, he had to nd creative ways to nd and seek out different sources of income in order
ensure his survival and contribute to the upkeep of his family back East. Although Eze doesn’t
possess any quali cations, he argues that “even though things can be very dif cult here, the truth
of the matter is that there is work to do and there is money to be made. Sometimes, you just have
to humble yourself ”.

Eze works 3 days a week, with a waste management company in the Kado district, picking trash
from the streets with his neighbor, who introduced him to this line of work. He described how
they wake up as early as 2:30 in the morning for their shifts, which begins at 4:00, due to the
competitive nature of the work, they have to make sure that they reach the of ce site early so that
they get chosen as part of the 24 people who would work, out of a pool of over 60 people. The
days he isn’t working, he takes his uncle’s truck to Gishiri market to meet with retailers seeking to
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purchase goods and provisions in bulk from the market. For instance, he notes that on a given
day, he drives to Suleja market in Niger State (which is cheaper than the capital) to purchase fresh
produce, or the abattoir for cow meat, goat meat, etc; for restaurants or suya joints. On occasion,
when he returns from Suleja, he would be asked by vendors to go to either Wuse or Utako
markets, to procure goods such as bottled water, can drinks, biscuits, etc; on behalf of the road
side kiosks or other small scale enterprises situated in Gishiri.

At the end of the week (a good week), Eze claims to expect between N80,000 - N120,000
(US$194 - US$292). Although this might seem as easy cash, Eze also notes that there are days
when he comes back home with less than N10,000, (US$24) due to reasons beyond his control.
For instance, there are times when he isn’t selected to work with the waste management company
because he was late or just overlooked or if he is unable to use his uncle’s truck to make market
runs, due to mechanical issues or in use; or if vendors don’t pay at the expected time as promised.
However, in spite of these challenges, Eze maintains that his saving grace is from the relationships
he has established with the waste management company, alongside the vendors in Gishiri who
seek and rely on him to bring goods for them to sell. According to Eze, “no matter how bad and
dif cult things can be here, there is always work that people will pay you to do. If there is
nothing, I’ll nd something small, even if it is to sweep in front of someones shop. God forbid
that because of money, you will see me begging on the street or hear that I have stolen. God
forbid. If I go to bed hungry today, it ok, because I know that I have to work harder tomorrow”.

The Professionals (aka big boys) are individuals who undertake activities which are often deemed
as illegal by the law. These are the cyber ‘419’ scam artists, and those dealing drugs, which, as
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noted in the review, was becoming a serious cause for concern within the nation. Not surprisingly,
in Gishiri, drug peddling was one of the most pro table economic activity which youths engaged
in. This was evident at almost every turns, young people are “manning their corner” particularly around bars, kiosks and restaurants (a majority presumedly to be below the age of
21) offering to sell a variety of drugs, such as tramadol, SK (marijuana), Arizona (a strain of
marijuana), amongst other substances, which “could be readily available, no problem at all”.
During my interaction with an individual who is engaged in this line of work, he stated how he
began selling at the age of 14 with some of his friends on different corners. “When we started
doing it, we didn’t know what we were carrying. They would just give us a bag and tell us to go
and drop it somewhere or give it to somebody. They would tell us not to open the bag - if we do,
we would enter trouble. They would call me at anytime of to go and drop or collect something.
Whenever they sent us for message, they would give me N3,000 for transport, which was not bad
and from there, it just became normal

As a result of his involvement in this trade for over 10 years, he has been able to climb up the
ranks and he proudly draws attention to the fact that he has been able to accomplish things that
his peers “could only dream of at the age of 25”. He has been able to buy 3 fairly used cars (1 for
his personal use, the other 2 for uber and bolt); rent a 2-bedroom apartment at an undisclosed
location in the city (where he stays with his mum, brother and sister); and also bought 4 okadas
and 3 keke napep in Gishiri for commercial purposes. However, it would be impossible to believe
that he has accomplished these feats simply by judging his appearance. At rst glance, he could
easily be mistaken as any other young man, roaming round the streets with nothing to do;
however, there is a reason for this. For instance, before leaving his house, he leaves his
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smartphones at home and picks up his burner phones; and calls one of his foot soldiers to pick
him up at a destination of his choosing. He also stays in Gishiri for 3 or 4 days out of the week.
There is a reason for this musical chairs dance. He notes that for people like him, amongst others
who are at (or working towards) his level or higher in trade in Gishiri, it is critically important to
“blend in” due to the fact that “there are many eyes out there, full of envy, greed and jealousy. If
people know what I did or where I stay or what I have, they would not think about it for a second
- they would look for a way to gun me down. It is a very risky, but so far, so good. There are a
number of times when I was almost casted (exposed) but.. we are still standing”.

Although he acknowledges and recognizes the dangers and risks associated with his trade, the
reason he continues to engage in this line of work is because “the money is very good. Even
though there is plenty of risk, the money is better than anything else you can nd. You see a
corner like this, by the end of the week, I am expecting to make nothing less than N150,000
(US$365); and that is just this one corner. Only a few people here that are my age mates can
boast of making or seeing of money. I remember when I told my mother what I was doing, and
she started crying, I asked her to if she knows of any other place where someone that is 25 years
old would be guaranteed to make N250,000 (US$608) a month in this Naija; she should show me
and I will leave this work and go and work there”. Apart from Gishiri where he has a strong
presence, he notes that he has built a strong network of customers based in af uent areas in the
Capital, where he sells “other stuff ”.

Owing to the nature of his trade, he expresses the fact that the loyalty and trust “is the most
important thing to him”. Although he has a handful of friends who he knows he is certain of
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their loyalty and trust, when it comes to his foot soldiers on the eld, he demands “absolute and
unquestionable loyalty when I give them instructions to do for me”, but he also admits that this
very dif cult to come by because “there are plenty judases that will rat you out the moment
someone ashes small change in their front. They will start talking like tap owing out of water”.
However, he has found ways to circumvent this challenge. For instance, he choses to associate
himself more with people from his own ethnic groups - particularly those from his own local
government area “because they are my people and we understand and relate with each other on
another level. We know ourselves from the village. And if anything happens… you understand”.
The other option which he also has at his disposal stems from the relationships he has established
with people, whom due to their association and allegiance with certain obscure element, they are
sworn by oath of secrecy, not to divulge - under no circumstances - any information pertaining
to the activities they undertake, (for obvious reasons, he wouldn’t provide a straightforward
answer as to whether he is part of any cult or other groups) they also act as his protection. He
also notes that he has people in the police, who often provide him with information concerning
any events, such as raids that might be on the horizon.

As a person of faith, he notes that certain rules are in place which his foot soldiers must always
adhere to. Under no circumstances are his products allowed to be sold to children and women;
they can never be found selling around schools, churches or mosques, and the police station; they
cannot “lose guard” (appear too ashing, drawing unnecessary attention); his foot soldiers cannot
encroach upon the space of competition; they cannot get high off the products they sell; amongst
other commands and established rules. However, he notes that “this isn’t cheap at all. Just to keep
everyone and everything tight, I make sure that I pay them well. Every month, I spend a

fl

fi

fl

fl

fi

77

minimum of N300,000 (US$730) just to make sure that they have my back. The reason why he
has to be extra careful stems from the fact that he has to, not only ensure the loyalty and trust
from his customer base, but also his handlers, because “we are talking about very big and
powerful people in government. The type of people you see on TV everyday. Believe me, you
don’t want to mess with them at all”.

Although he has been able to pro t well from this trade, he stated that he was currently working
on “leaving this joint” due to his belief that he is “getting too old for this work. As of right now,
my focus is to save enough money so that I can go back to University - but this time, outside this
country. It's already in the works and I’m hoping, God willing, that by this time next year, I’m out
of this place”.

Informal Leadership
Laguerre (1994, p. 14), rightly notes that, “the informal system emerges to ll a need because of a
failure of the formal system. It helps smooth the functioning of the formal system. Its existence
rests on the inability of the formal system to meet everyone’s expectations”. This was particularly
evident when engaging with stakeholders about the security situation in Gishiri. Furthermore,
light was also shed on the dynamics between the formal and informal. Whilst acknowledging the
existence of their elected representatives, it was noted that they were detached from the activities
taking place in Gishiri. In their absence, the elders within the community (chiefs, pastors, imams,
amongst other persons of in uences and stakeholders) have picked up the mantle to act in their
stead as the governing authority, overseeing and preceding state of affairs in Gishiri.
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For instance, they constituted committees, such as environmental, health, youth, and security
affairs, amongst others; each made up of at least 6 individuals, whom were all volunteers and not
paid to do the work. According to the youth leader, “we meet every 2 weeks to update the elders
of what is happening here in the community and they give us advice on how to proceed on a
matter”. Whilst these committees are not outrightly legal due to the fact that they are not part of
the political framework, the youth leader made it absolutely clear that “these committees that our
elders set up would not have worked without the backing and support from our politicians and
the police of cers”.

During my rst visit to Gishiri for the purposes of this research study, the community was in a
state of high tension because a burglary incident at a restaurant, where the robber(s) took off
with a brand new television set. When criminal activities takes place, it is expected that the rst
port of call would be the report such a case to police authorities; after all, the police station
occupies a central and unmissable location within the community. However, in Gishiri, this is not
often the case. This is borne out of their personal experiences with them. Mustapha drew
attention to his last encounter with the police authorities, when he went to their station to report
that his phone was stolen in broad daylight, “they asked me to write a police statement and that
they will call me. I went to their station plenty times to see if they have any information. They
said they will call me, I should not worry. That they are making progress. I remember the last
time I went, they said that I was disturbing them and acting as if I was the only people who has
been robbed before. Since that day, I swore that I will never set my foot inside the station”.
Towing the same line, Titus, who described the authorities as “useless” and “weak”, argued that
“we cannot trust or even respect them because we know how they behave. When you are trying
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to hustle so that you can buy food for you and your family to survive, that is when they will target
you and start harassing you. When you enter their wahala (trouble) you have no choice but to
settle them with something (bribe them) if not, you cannot know peace”. Rather than go the
police route, they prefer to bring matters arising to these committees because “we know them and
they are on our side”.

Drawing the attention of the youth leader to the information given by these individuals, he
explained that owing to the tension between the police and the youths, the various committees
serve as the link, and they always collaborate when matters arise because “no matter how bad the
relations are, they always have to be in the know, whether we like it or not”. Re ecting on events
during the COVID-19 lockdown in the community, the youth leader noted that “two weeks into
the lockdown, things in Gishiri was very very bad. In short, it was dangerous. People were
hungry. People were just breaking into houses and stealing anything that they could sell so that
they could eat. As we were trying to deal with that matter, some cultists and gang rivals began
making noise. Everybody had to act”. In order to quell these issue, the elders in the community,
the committee members, and police mobilized a group of individuals to work incognito to serve
as “vigilantes” and “nightswatchman”, who are tasked with patrolling the streets in an attempt to
resolve these issues.

Probing further as to how he manages to address issues associated with the nefarious cult and
gang groups, who are predominately youths, rather than providing a straightforward response, all
he said was, “we know them and we understand ourselves”. Interestingly, those who bene t from
this tacit arrangement are the police authorities. According to an of cer to spoke to me under
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strict conditions of anonymity said, “there is nothing happening here that we don’t know about,
but we have a lot of pressures, and funding is just one of them. Abuja is where the President lives
and we are surrounded by big people and they don’t like to hear about trouble. This is why we
allow the elders and their committees handle matters before they come to our front”.
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Conclusion
Contributing to the existing literature on the subject of the informal economy, this paper has
attempted to shed light on some of the main reasons which in uences the decision of multitudes
of peoples to engage, interact and integrate themselves within spaces of informality, as against
the formal economy. The main objective of this paper is to draw attention to the important role
of the informal economy in providing a “safety net” especially for the youths, who are “living in
the cracks of a rule system that could not reach down to their level” (Hart, 2015).

To be informal is to be human. According to Laguerre, who describes the informality as both
“the behavior of actors” (p.6) and “a structure of action” (p.7), draws attention to the fact that
“human life is recognized as having both a formal and an informal side. At the individual level,
informality is understood here as a way of life. At the personal level, it is a re ection of human
freedom, an implicit or explicit choice that an individual actor makes to locate himself or herself
in a retreat position vis-a-vis the formal apparatus of society. The causes for such a retreat are
multiple. They include the necessity to meet a personal need, to experience a different reality, to
challenge the formal system or simply to express one’s socialization and one’s routine of everyday
life” (p.8).

In this paper, it has already been established that the vast range of socio-economic activities
taking place across diverse spaces of informality continues to play a prominent role in nations
situated in the Global South such as Nigeria, owing to its capacity to provide employment
opportunities to millions, alongside its contribution it the national economy. Furthermore, it has
also been noted that the main reason why people chose to integrate themselves within spaces of
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informality stems from their recognition that they cannot depend on the formal economy to
ensure and guarantee their socio-economic and political wellbeing. This recognition stems from
the failure of the State to invest in education, broadband connectivity, healthcare, transportation,
social services, amongst other critical infrastructures; which has the potential to generate
employment opportunities for millions, whilst radically improving the socio-economic and
political landscape of the nations. Perhaps more important is the inability of the State to ensure
and guarantee the security of her population.

The inability of the State to enact and implement policies which are geared towards fostering a
business friendly environment, has also contributed to the growth of the informal economy in
Nigeria. The challenges faced by Small and Medium Size enterprises (SMSEs) in Nigeria serves
as a typical example. Although SMEs are “considered as the engine of economic growth and for
promoting equitable development” (Aremu and Adeyemi, 2011, p.200); and responsible for “96%
of businesses and 84% of employment” in Nigeria (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2020, p.3); it is
estimated that “on average, 50% of SMEs that are started eventually fail” owing to the failure of
the State to “give enough backing to the SMEs sector” (Ufua et al, 2020 p.2).

Whilst it must be acknowledged that the vast range of socio-economic (and increasingly political)
activities continues to mitigate the negligence of the State by means of generating job
opportunities, it also critically important to draw attention to the fact that these informal activities
are facing undue challenges, particularly from policymakers originating from international
institutions. By drawing attention to the vulnerabilities associated with these activities, alongside
the claims that their activities drags down the economic viability of the nation, particularly due to
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their assertion that those operating within spaces of informality operate in spaces of informality
so that can avoid the payment of taxes.

In order to stem the perceived threats they claim the informal economy poses, policymakers have
often advocated for the “formalization” and “transition” to the formal economy. Unfortunately,
they continue disregard the fact that it is virtually impossible to get rid of the informal economy
and remain oblivious to the profound and far-reaching impact the informal economy in enabling
in the creation of jobs and giving people an opportunity to not only survive and escape from the
claws of poverty, but also to seek alternative avenues to ght towards the actualization of their
their ambitions and dreams. Furthermore, they fail to recognize the fact that political actors have
no incentives to eradicate the informal activities taking places across diverse spaces of informality,
owing to the fact that these are the avenues upon which they draw their support from.

During the course of conducting this eldwork research in Gishiri, it was impossible to ignore the
very fact that informal spaces are undergoing a pivotal paradigm shift. First and foremost, in spite
of the adverse circumstances and conditions which these brave young men and women are
forced to contend and wrestle with on a daily basis in Gishiri, it was intriguing and reassuring to
learn that they haven’t given up hope in achieving their dreams. For instance, Yetunde, who
hopes to become a Medical Doctor, often watches American and British medical shows such as
House and Casualty; alongside volunteering as a nurse at the local hospital. Abdul, who
desperately yearns to get an academic quali cation notes that the days when he is off work, he
visits a friend who is enrolled at Baze University, who gives him access to the library, so he can
borrow books on engineering, which he brings back with him to Gishiri and reads during his
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breaks from work and in the evenings “after I pray and before I sleep”. Ade notes that every
Saturday morning “if rain doesn’t fall”, he goes with a group of friends to football

elds,

especially at the National Stadium to play football and also showcase his talent, because “you
never know when a scouting agent will show. I always have to be ready”.

Increasingly, young people without any formal education can be found in cyber cafes, using
YouTube and other interactive platforms such as uLesson (an online learning service in Nigeria)
to educate themselves and gain knowledge, by conducting research on various exciting and
intriguing and novel topics, of personal importance. Furthermore, these young people, armed
with cheap smartphones and other technological devices, - eager not to be left behind - are
rapidly making every effort to attain relevant skills which they believe would enable them march
towards prosperity. This was apparent during the group interactions, were I noticed the
respondents engaging in the compelling conversation about the ebbs and

ows of various

cryptocurrencies, such as bitcoin and dogecoin; and also how they are learning about how to
trade in foreign currencies. In my discussion with the youth leader about this compelling
observation, he noted that “it is something else. This was the new thing that youths want to invest
their money in. All of them are always following crypto. Some of them that I know don’t even
want to spend their money on playing bets again, instead, they want to save their money and
invest in crypto. It is good. After all, everybody no say Naira no get value again” (everybody
knows that the Naira no longer has value).

Whilst it is acknowledged hat these young individuals - of whom possess the capacity to
transform the socio-economic and political landscape of their community and nation at large -
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are driven and motivated to seek avenues for growth and prosperity; it is critical to recognize the
very fact that they need guidance, help and support. Rather than relying and waiting on the
government to make things right, it is critically important for individuals - especially those of us
who have had the opportunity to attain a level of exposure outside the shores of Nigeria - to use
our established networks (both local and international) to look for ways in which we can help in
alleviating the socio-economic and political pressures which the youths of forced to wrestle with
on a daily basis. We cannot assume to remain blind to the consequences of their abandonment,
marginalization and the resulting social exclusion which they are forced to contend in on a daily
basis. Even though we are blessed and fortunate to be living amongst the upper echelons of
Nigerian society, we cannot claim to be ignorant of the sufferings of young people, because the
very moment we step out of our Air Conditioned environs, we see the impact of poverty on
children, who have been robbed on their innocence at a very young age. For this reason, it is our
duty and responsibility to respond. It is imperative to respond to the tyranny of poverty, which
continues to drive multitudes of young men and women into becoming drug addicts, criminals
and terrorists. For this reason, it is critically important to take bold actions and steps.

One of those stepping up to the plate is Tunde Onakoya, the founder of Chess in Slums Africa
(CISA), who, since 2018, has been introducing the game of chess to children living in slum
communities, in an attempt to not only lure them away from crime, but more importantly, to
unlock their latent potentials. More importantly, the message which Mr. Onakoya, this getting
across to these young people know is that they are not forgotten to irrelevant, but rather that they
matter and they are of immense value to their families and communities at large. Something
similar can be achieved in Gishiri. During my interactions in Gishiri, it was obvious that the
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young men and women are very interested in becoming more integrated and entrenched in the
technology ecosystem, especially as they are determined and enthusiastic to learn and obtain
knowledge which would propel them to contribute meaningfully to their societies.

Before going any further, it is critically important to recognize the fact that Igboeli (2016) was
correct in describing the Nigerian youth as “bright”, “resilient” and “a born trailblazer”. This is
particularly the case for those in rural communities such as Gishiri, amongst across Nigeria.
Their innovativeness and raw talent is beyond outstanding. The manner in which they’ve used
social media apps such as Facebook, instagram, tiktok, amongst others; to showcase their talents
in various elds is nothing short of spellbinding. In acknowledgment of such expressions, it is
critically important to seek avenues on how to establish and set up a technological school in
Gishiri, so that these young people can be afforded the opportunity to enhance their knowledge
on the latest advancements in the technological space. In order to accomplish this, it is imperative
to explore the possibility of engaging with Western techs

rms and non-governmental

organizations (NGOs) assist by funding the establishment of educational institutions where young
people can work towards extracting themselves from arenas of crime and poverty. Furthermore,
in order to accomplish this feat, it would be critical to win the approval and support of the local
government authorities - both the Abuja Municipal Area Council (AMAC) and the Federal
Capital Territory Administration (FCTA) - owing to the fact that they have the power to provide,
for instance, the land within Gishiri, upon which this proposal can be manifested into reality.
These are the types of small, yet audacious and bold steps, which can transform the socioeconomic and political livelihood of young Nigerians. By giving young people a sense of purpose,
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we begin the journey of working towards ensuring that they are not caught in the quagmire of
the more nefarious aspects of the informal economy.

88

Works Cited:
1.

International Labor Organization. (2018). Women and men in the informal economy: A statistical
picture. International Labour Of ce, Geneva.

2.

Guven, M. and Karlen, R., (2020). Supporting Africa’s urban informal sector: Coordinated policies with
social protection at the core. The World Bank

3.

Medina, L., Jonelis, M. A. W., & Cangul, M. (2017). The informal economy in Sub-Saharan Africa:
Size and determinants. International Monetary Fund.

4.

Uko, F.E., Akpanoyoro, M.J., & Ekpe, J.P. (2020). An Evaluation of the Contribution to the Informal
Sector in Employment and Income Generation in Nigeria: Thematic Approach. Management, 1(2).

5.

Ohnsorge, F., & Yu, S. (2021). The Long Shadow of Informality: Challenges and Policies. The World
Bank.

6.

Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development.. (2007). DAC Guidelines and Reference
Series Promoting Pro-Poor Growth: Policy Guidance for Donors. OECD.

7.

Hart, K., (1973). Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana. The Journal of
Modern African Studies, 11(1), pp.61-89.

8.

International Labor Organization, The. (1972). Employment, Incomes and Equality. A strategy for
Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya. ILO.

9.

Bangasser, P. E. (2000). The ILO and the Informal Sector: An Institutional History (pp. 1-64).
Geneva: International Labour Organization.

10.

Rimmer, D. (1992) Staying Poor: Ghana's Political Economy 1950-1990, Pergamon Press: Oxford.

11. Lewis, W. A. (1954). Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour.
12. Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J., & Thaicharoen, Y. (2003). Institutional Causes,
Macroeconomic Symptoms: Volatility, Crises and Growth. Journal of monetary economics, 50(1),
49-123.
13. Buehn, A., & Schneider, F. (2012). Shadow economies around the world: novel insights, accepted
knowledge, and new estimates. International tax and public nance, 19(1), 139-171.
14. Daniels, P. W. (2004). Urban challenges: the formal and informal economies in mega-cities. Cities,
21(6), 501-511.

fi

fi

89

15. McLain, R. J. (2010). Incorporating understanding of informal economic activity in
natural resource and economic development policy. DIANE Publishing.
16. Guerguil, M. (1988). Some Thoughts on the De nition of the Informal Sector. Cepal Review.
17. Moser, C. O. (1978). Informal Sector or Petty Commodity Production: Dualism or Dependence in Urban
Development?. World Development, 6(9-10), 1041-1064.
18. Gerry, C. (1974). Petty Producers and the Urban Economy; A Case Study of Dakar (No.
991563753402676). International Labour Organization.
19. Charmes, J. (2012). The informal economy worldwide: Trends and characteristics. Margin: the journal
of applied economic research, 6(2), 103-132.
20. Charmes, J., (n.d). The informal economy: What is it? Where does it come from? How big
is it? Why is it growing? How to tackle it?. RESEARCH, NETWORK AND SUPPORT
FACILITY (RNSF) - EuropeAid/135649/DH/SER/MULTI VOLUME 2 –
DEFINITION OF THE INFORMAL ECONOMY,
21. Charmes, J. (2000). Evaluating the extent of non-registration–do we accept the challenge. The Courier
(December 1999–January 2000), 178, 62-64.
22. Kilby, P. (1971). Hunting the Heffalump. Entrepreneurship and Economic Development.
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign's Academy for Entrepreneurial Leadership
Historical Research Reference in Entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship and Economic
Development.
23. International Labour Of ce. (1993). Resolution Concerning Statistics of Employment in the Informal
Sector, adopted by the Fifteenth International Conference of Labour Statisticians. ICLS.
24. Lindell, I. (2010). Africa’s informal workers: Collective agency, Alliances and Transnational Organizing
in Urban Africa. 1-30.
25. Mörtenböck, P. (2015). Global Informality: Bottom-Up Trade and Transnational Realignments.
Informal Market Worlds Reader: The Architecture of Economic Pressure, 105-118
26. Laguerre, M. S. (1994). The Informal City (pp. 1-180). Palgrave Macmillan, London
27. Huang, G., Xue, D., & Wang, B. (2020). Integrating Theories on Informal Economies: An
Examination of Causes of Urban Informal Economies in China. Sustainability, 12(7), 2738.
28. Navarrete-Hernández, P. (2017). From Survival to Social Mobility: Supporting the Informal Economy in
Santiago de Chile (Doctoral dissertation, The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)).

fi

fi

90

29. Marinescu, C., & Mircioi, I. (2019). The Main Currents (Schools) of Thought about the Informal
Economy. Revista de Management Comparat International, 20(3), 312-316.
30. Sassen, S. (1997). Informalization in Advanced Market Economies (Vol. 20).
Development Policies Department, International Labour Of ce.
31. Leswing, K. (2022). Apple becomes rst U.S. company to reach $3 trillion market cap.
CNBC. Retrieved 2022, from https://www.cnbc.com/2022/01/03/apple-becomes- rstus-company-to-reach-3-trillion-market-cap.html.
32. BBC News. (2014). Apple 'failing to protect Chinese factory workers’. Retrieved 2021,
from https://www.bbc.com/news/business-30532463.
33. China Labor Watch. (2016). Something's Not Right Here: Poor Working Conditions
Persist at Apple Supplier Pegatron : Retrieved 2021, from https://chinalaborwatch.org/
somethings- not-right-here-poor-working-conditions-persist-at-apple-supplier-pegatron/.
34. Chabal, P. (2013). Africa: The Politics of Suffering and Smiling. Zed Books Ltd.
35. Wilson, T. D. (2011). Introduction: Approaches to the informal economy. Urban
Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development,
40(3/4), 205-221.
36. Assaad, R., Krafft, C., & Yassin, S. (2020). Job creation or labor absorption? An analysis of private
sector job growth in Egypt. Middle East Development Journal, 12(2), 177-207.
37. Bugnicourt, J. (2000). A hope ignored: the Informal or Popular Economy. The Courier:
Africa-Caribbean-Paci c-European Union, 178(December1999/January).
38. Olubiyi, T. (2021). Informal economy: A hidden engine of growth. Retrieved 2022, from
https://guardian.ng/informal-economy-a-hidden-engine-of-growth/.
39. Gamal, A. A. M., & Dahalan, J. B. (2016). Underground economy in Saudi Arabia: A
study based on currency demand function. Актуальні проблеми економіки, (5), 76-85.
40. Romero, T. (2021). Share of informal employment in Brazil 2020. Statista. Retrieved
2022.
41. Neuwirth, R. (2012). Stealth of Nations: The Global Rise of the Informal Economy. Anchor.
42. La Porta, R., & Shleifer, A. (2014). Informality and development. Journal of economic
perspectives, 28(3), 109-26.
43. Farrell, D. (2004). Hidden Dangers. The McKinsey Quarterly, (3), 26.

fi

fi

fi

fi

91

44. Perry, G. (Ed.). (2007). Informality: Exit and exclusion. World Bank Publications.
45. Elbahnasawy, N. G., Ellis, M. A., & Adom, A. D. (2016). Political Instability and the
Informal Economy. World Development, 85, 31-42.
46. Keen, M. (2015). Why we need to rethink the informal economy. World Economic Forum (WEF).
47. Bromley, R. (2000). Street Vending and Public Policy: A Global Review. The
International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 20(1/2): 1-28.
48. Erezi, D. (2020). Lagos bans okada, keke in Ikeja, Apapa, four other LGs. The Guardian.
49. Kazeem, Y. (2020). Lagos has banned its most effective methods of transport—including bike-hailing
startups. Quartz.
50. Dasgupta, M. (2016). Moving from Informal to Formal Sector and what it means for
Policymakers. World Bank Blogs. Retrieved 2021, from https://blogs.worldbank.org/
jobs/ moving-informal-formal-sector-and-what-it-means-policymakers.
51. Karl, Kenneth. (2000). The Informal Sector. The Courier 178 (2000): 53-54.
52. Becker, K. F. (2004). The Informal Economy: Fact Finding Study. (Vol. 76). Stockholm: Sida.
53. Lamsa, A. (2012). Marginalization & Social Exclusion. Retrieved 2021.
54. Levitas, R, Christina P, Eldin F David Gordon, E. Lloyd-Reichling, and Demy P. (2007).
"The Multi-Dimensional Analysis of Social Exclusion." Retrieved 2021.
55. The World Bank. (2021). Nigeria | Data. Data.worldbank.org. Retrieved 2022, from
https://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria.
56. Odeh, N. (2021). Soyinka: Nigeria is in a mess. Retrieved 2022, from https://
thenewsnigeria.com.ng/2021/10/28/nigeria-in-a-mess-soyinka/.
57. World Poverty Clock. (2022). Nigeria. Retrieved 2022, from https://
worldpovertyclock.io/map/Nigeria.
58. Borgen. (2020). The Poverty Capital of the World: NIGERIA. Retrieved 2021, from
https:// www.borgenmagazine.com/the-poverty-capital-of-the-world-nigeria/.
59. Oxfam International. (2021). Nigeria: extreme inequality in numbers | Oxfam
International. Retrieved 2022, from https://www.oxfam.org/en/nigeria-extremeinequality-numbers.

92

60. Silverman, J. (2021). Dual Economy Theory Revisited: Governance and the Role of the
Informal Sector. The Society For The Advancement Of Socio Economics (SASE).
Retrieved 2021.
61. Puentes, R. (2015). Why Infrastructure Matters: Rotten Roads, Bum Economy. Brookings.
Retrieved 2021, from https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/why-infrastructure-mattersrotten-roads-bum-economy/.
62. McNichol, E. (2016). It’s time for States to Invest in Infrastructure. Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities. Retrieved 2021, www.cbpp. org/research/state-budget-and-tax/its-timefor-states-to-invest-ininfrastructure
63. World Bank. (2018). Global Rankings 2018 | Logistics Performance Index.
Lpi.worldbank.org. Retrieved 2021, from https://lpi.worldbank.org/international/
global/ 2018?sort=asc&order=Infrastructure
64. Bello-Schünemann, J., & Porter, A. (2017). Building the future Infrastructure in Nigeria until 2040.
Institute for Security Studies (ISS)
65. Popoola, A. A., & Adeleye, B. M. (2020). Access and Limitations to Clean Energy use in
Nigeria. In Dynamics of Energy, Environment and Economy (pp. 241-262). Springer,
Cham.
66. Johnson, K. E., & Ifeoma, U. (2018). Rural development as a panacea for rural–urban
migration in Nigeria. Art Human Open Acc J, 2(5), 241-244.
67. Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP). (2005). Nigeria: Expanding
Access to Rural Infrastructure Issues and Options for Rural Electri cation, Water Supply
and Telecommunications. The International Bank For Reconstruction And
Development/ THE WORLD BANK. Retrieved 2021.
68. Accountable Nigeria Initiative. (2020). Youth, Education & The Future: Where Do We Stand?
ACCOUNTABLE NIGERIA.
69. Onyekpe, J. G. N. (2007). Managing the youth at election. The Constitution, 7(1), 76-87.
70. National Youth Policy. (2019). National Youth Policy: Enhancing Youth Development and Participation
in the context of Sustainable Development. Retrieved 2021.
71. Idris, F., Hassan, Z., Ya’acob, A., Gill, S. K., & Awal, N. A. M. (2012). The role of
Education in Shaping Youth's National Identity. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences,
59, 443-450.

fi

93

72. Taggart, M. (2003). The nature and functions of the State. In The Oxford handbook of
legal studies.
73. YUSUF, U. L. (2019). Youths as Agents of Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremist in North-East
Nigeria. University of Maiduguri - Faculty of Social Sciences
74. U.S. Department of Education. (2020). STEM Investments FY18-20. U.S DoE. Retrieved
2021.
75. European Commission. (2019). How much do governments spend on recreation and sport?. Ec.europa.eu.
Retrieved 2021.
76. Igboeli, A. (2016). The state of the Nigerian youth. Retrieved 2022, from https://punchng.com/statenigerian-youth/.
77. Fayehun, F., & Isiugo-Abanihe, U. (2020). #EndSARS: How Nigeria can tap into its youthful
population. The Conversation. Retrieved 2022, from https://theconversation.com/endsars-how-nigeriacan-tap-into-its-youthful-population-148319.
78. Jatau, A. I., Sha’aban, A., Gulma, K. A., Shitu, Z., Khalid, G. M., Isa, A., & Mustapha, M.
(2021). The burden of drug abuse in Nigeria: a scoping review of epidemiological studies and drug laws.
Public health reviews, 42.
79. Eneji, A. P., & Ikeorji, C. R. (2018). Youth Political Participation and Electoral Violence in The 21 st
Century Nigeria: Bridging The Gap. World Journal of Innovative Research, 4(6), 9-13.
80. Meagher, K. (2014). Beyond terror: addressing the Boko Haram challenge in Nigeria. Norwegian Peace
Building Resource Center Policy Brief.
81. Ajufo, B. I. (2013). Challenges of Youth Unemployment in Nigeria: Effective Career Guidance as a
Panacea. African research review, 7(1), 307-321.
82. Nigerian Bureau of Statistics. (2021). Labor Force Statistics: Unemployment and Underemployment
Report (Q4 2020). Nigerian Bureau Of Statistics (NBS). Retrieved 2021.
83. L. O. Odia & S.I. Omofonmwan (2007) Educational System in Nigeria Problems and Prospects,
Journal of Social Sciences, 14:1, 86-85, DOI: 10.1080/09718923.2007.11978347
84. Ekundayo, O. (2019). Education in Nigeria is in a mess from top to bottom. Five things can x it. The
Conversation. Retrieved 2022, from https://theconversation.com/education-in-nigeria-is-in-a-mess-fromtop-to-bottom- ve-things-can- x-it-112894.
85. Fatunmole, M. (2021). Nigeria gets lowest education budget size in six years, months after president's
promise to double funding. International Centre for Investigative Reporting. Retrieved 2022, from https://

fi

fi

fi

94

www.icirnigeria.org/nigeria-gets-lowest-education-budget-size-in-six-years-months-after-presidentspromise-to-double-funding/.
86. Usman, S. (2020). Nigeria: 2021 Budget - Sports Ministry to Spend N1.805bn On Refreshment,
Travel. The Leadership. Retrieved 2021.
87. UNESCO. (2020). What You Need to Know about the Right to Education. Retrieved 2021.
88. Yusuf, K. (2020). Nigerian Universities on Strike for one of every ve years since 1999, data shows.
Retrieved 2021.
89. Gboyega, I. (2007). Cultism and violent behaviours in tertiary institutions in Nigeria. Zimbabwe Journal
Of Educational Research, 17(1). https://doi.org/10.4314/zjer.v17i1.26055
90. Ajitoni, S., & Olaniyan, O. (2018). Causes and Panacea to Problem of Cultism in the Nigerian
Education System. European Journal Of Education Studies, 4(2). https://doi.org/ doi: 10.5281/
zenodo.1183835
91. Peterside, D. (2021). Striking at the future of the Nigerian youth. TheCable. Retrieved 2021.
92. Iwara, M. (2021). How Mass Kidnappings of Students Hinder Nigeria’s Future. United States
Institute of Peace (USIP). Retrieved 2021.
93. Magashi, B. (2021). Don’t be cowards to face bandits who sometimes carry three rounds of ammunition
― Minister of Defence. Nigerian Tribune. Retrieved 2021.
94. Masari, A. (2021). Self-help Creed. The Nation Newspaper. Retrieved 2021.
95. Ostrom, E., Schroeder, L., & Wynne, S. (1989). Institutional Incentives And Sustainable Development.
Draft state-of-the-art paper prepared for USAID "Decentralization: Finance and Management Project.
Retrieved 2021.
96. Azarya, V., & Chazan, N. (1987). Disengagement from the State in Africa: Re ections on the
Experience of Ghana and Guinea. Comparative studies in society and history, 29(1), 106-131.
97. Aremu, M. A., & Adeyemi, S. L. (2011). Small and medium scale enterprises as a survival strategy for
employment generation in Nigeria. Journal of sustainable development, 4(1), 200.
98. Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, B. (2020). FSS 2020 International Conference, SME: Issues, Challenges and
Prospects, Financial System Strategy, 2020. Central Bank of Nigeria.
99. Ufua, D. E., Olujobi, O. J., Ogbari, M. E., Dada, J. A., & Edafe, O. D. (2020). Operations of small
and medium enterprises and the legal system in Nigeria. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications,
7(1), 1-7.

fl

fi

95

100. Hart, K. (2015). How the informal economy took over the world. Informal market worlds reader: The
architecture of economic pressure.
101. Obi, O. (2020). Gishiri: Where poverty, af uence meet. The Sun. Retrieved 2022, from https://
www.sunnewsonline.com/gishiri-where-poverty-af uence-meet/

fl

fl

96

97

